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ABSTRACT
This thesis contains material for the course, Introduction to Command, Control
and Communications (C3). The first part of the thesis describes selected principles
and concepts of C3 related to communication management, interoperability,
command structure and standardization. The Crisis Action System is described
emphasizing the roles and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and-the Office of the
Secrftary of Defense. A discussion of decision making in command and control
exatn ines the principles of unity of command, echelon skipping and span of control.
Finally, the Joint Task Force (JTF) apparatus is reviewed from the perspective of
interoperability.
The second part of the thesis contains four case studies designed to provide
an understanding of command and control by developing a competence to diagnose
and solve command and control situations. The solutions to the cases require
applying the principles and concepts presented in the first part. The four cases are:
(1) the Iran hostage rescue attempt; (2) the invasion of Grenada; (3) the raid on
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The concept of command and control (C2) is a constantly evolving and vital
process in today's military organizations. In principle, the development of C3
systems in the U.S. can be viewed as a function of the interaction of several factors:
(1) the availability of technological capabilities; (2) changes in the geo-political
environment and the political role of the U.S. military force in international affairs;
(3) military requirements as determined by U.S. strategic doctrine, the perceived
threat to national security, and the operational requirements of different weapons
systems and; (4) the evolution of a political-strategic doctrine that was predicated
on providing the commander in chief with the means to manage and control levels
of military conflict and escalation ranging from crisis management through
conventional war and nuclear strategic warfare.
The fundamental task of C2 systems remains constant. It is to serve the
process of making, disseminating, and implementing informed command decisions
in order to obtain optimum effectiveness of the nation's military forces and resources
in peacetime, crisis, hostile actions, and war. Command and control system success
then can be measured by the way it supports this process reliably and effectively -
at every level and in all circumstances.
The "vital" aspect of the C2 process can best be appreciated by reviewing some
of the penalties associated with its failure. In the author's opinion, C2 specialists
have a mindset (although pragmatic in approach) which tends to focus on what is
and what might be rather than on what has been. Over the past decade, four
separate and distinct significant military actions have been conducted by the United
States: the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Libya raid, the Grenada invasion and
the S.S. Mayaguez rescue. In each operation, detailed post-action analysis was
conducted to describe "lessons-learned." Different command, control, and
communications (C3) structures were used in each case. One of the principal
questions that was explored by these studies in each of these operations was whether
or not the U.S. military establishment learned from them. Analysts and military
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experts claim that the same lessons continue to occur in each operation because the
military does not do an adequate job of institutionalizing or transferring the
experiences of one operation to subsequent operations.
A. PURPOSE
In view of today's weapons of mass destruction, general warfare as it was
waged in World War I and World War II has significantly changed. General warfare
as seen in those times has altered. Since then, the U.S. has faced limited warfare
and low-intensity conflict. Insurgency, terrorism, revolution and civil war now
dominate today's military operations.
The purpose of this thesis is to enhance an understanding of command and
control, and to develop competence in diagnosing and solving command, control and
communications situations. For the purposes of this paper, the term "command" will
be used to denote the function to be performed, the term C3 will stand for the
supporting system, while the term C2 will mean the process that commanders follow
(in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling) as they-utilize C3 systems to
carry out the function of command.
This thesis will illustrate the objectives taught in the course -- Introduction to
C3 -- through comparative case studies which are focused on recent real-world
military contingency operations. The primary area of focus will be to illustrate C3
in- a present day context. It will provide an introduction to the role of
communication in the C3 process. Command and control planning in crisis response
will be the backdrop for identifying military and civilian deficiencies in the military
operations examined. The overall C2 process will be examined primarily from the
perspective of decision making, where the commander, the decision maker, is at a
distance from both the phenomena on which he bases his decisions and from the
people who execute them.
A commander at any ecbelon worries about many things, but the three
significant ones are:
* whether he will be informed of significant events that affect his operation,
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" whether he will be able to transform the information he receivesinto sensible
and timely decisions,
" whether his decisions will be executed in time lo affect the out come of the
operation. (Van Creveld, 1985, pg. 17)
Hence, this paper will provide a vehicle for deciding how things happened, how
these things should have happened, what C3 structure was in place to respond (and
provide support) to the crisis and what C3 structural changes could (or should) have
been made.
B. BACKGROUND
U.S. history, from its very beginning, reflects a desire to limit centralized
(governmental) control and depend on locally elected leaders to exercise control for
the overall good of the people. Separation of powers in federal government --
executive, judicial, and legislative branches -- has been continually stressed as an
important fundamental principle. As a developing nation with N.dely divergent
interests, the U.S. has brought forth separate and diverse economic and political
power bases. A political culture developed which emphasized the advantages of
diversity, local initiative, and self-reliance. Authority was often delegated to (or
assumed by) those who would execute required tasks. Even today in business and
industry, authority is relegated to lower (or lowest) levels of management. The
trend in military matters may seem to refute this style, but the preferred approach
emphasizes a style of management without rigid control mechanisms (Gissin, 1979,
pp. 48-69).
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The U.S.'s approach to military forces reflects the constitution and a
governmental tradition that regulates the organization of military servides and the
national command arrangement. Although the president is commander in chief of
our military forces, it is Congress that is given the constitutional authority to raise
and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to- make rules for the
regulation of the land and naval forces. Over the years, Congress has opposed any
effort to create a general staff and has generally encouraged a degree of
decentralization within each service as well. Historically, and in recent times, U.S.
military leaders have espoused the concept of granting substantial autonomy to
lower echelon commanders. Furthermore, congressional mandates have led the
military to acquire the practice of deferring to civilian institutions, private and
public. The result is a military organization which has significant variety, emphasizes
decentralization and dispersal of effective influence, and takes for granted that
effective action to -achieve a goal requires the consent of many others (e.g., military
commanders must often negotiate to make efficient use of assets that belong to
other services). Even in the area of strategic nuclear forces (SNF), where the U.S.
has developed a system of detailed pre-planning and tight control over weapons use,
the processes of policy planning and procurement are decentralized and ngotiated.
The historical and political implications touched on thus far constitute an
extremely complex subject that is not all that well understood but has had a major
impact on the evolution of C3 systems. The broad background factors briefly
presented here are reflected in C3 systems by management techniques,
organizational structure, information flow processes, relationships between command
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echelons, and interpersonal relationships within commands. In assessing U.S. C3
systems, it is helpful to consider:
* factors affecting C3 development;
e the concept of a decentralized power structure;
* the concept of no dominant service;
* qualities such as initiative and innovation;
* and the influence of a loose and unstructured control mechanism.
It is evident that the importance of C3 will continue to increase in the future.
While C3 has always played a critical role in all warfare areas and during transition
between levels of conflict, the speed of information flow and the range, mobility
and destructiveness of modern weapons have added a new dimension to C3
requirements. (Boyes, Andriole, 1987, pp. xi-xiv)
C. CASE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The purpose of using a comparative case methodology is to develop
competence in diagnosing organizational and institutional situations, specifically
from a C3 perspective. There are numerous philosophies with regard to the case
method. Essentially, the case is a vehicle by which a chunk of reality is brought into
a class to be analyzed and understood. They are catalysts for enhancing the process
of learning from experience. Case study allows the student to apply concepts,
theories, and techniques to an actual incident within the military organization.
(Dooley, Skinner, 1977, pp. 277-289)
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The case method originated at the Harvard Business School as a link between
the classroom and the real world. The cases presented in this thesis are real and
reflect the writings of people who were actually involved in the operations.
Although many of the "lessons-learned" in these conflicts have been institutionalized,
many still remain "unsolved." The guidelines here are designed to help the student
make the most out of the case method (Dooley, Skinner, 1977, pp. 277-289):
1. Read the corresponding material in the textbooks of the course. This
establishes a theoretical framework for analysis.
2. Read the case. Note the important points of the case.
3. Reread the case.
4. Analyze the case using the following model:
A. Problem identification
1. Define the major problem(s)
a. Use the organizational terms and concepts of the course work.
b. Not all information presented in the case may be relevant.
c. If not all the information is available, be prepared to make some
assumptions.
2. Define the secondary problem(s)
a. Use the same standards as for the major problem.
b. Understand why they are secondary problems.
B. Analyze the situation
1. State the most reasonable cause(s) of the problems identified.
2, State the relevant concepts, definitions, theories, structures to the
problem(s).
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3. State insights that are present.
C. Solutions
1. Consider possible solutions to the problems.
a. Generate as many solutions as feasible.
b. Look at probable effects of each solution--consider pros and cons
of each.
2. Choose "best" solution.
3. Describe implementation procedures.
a. Explain what changes have to -be made to the organization.
b. Define the risks.
c. Are there other aspects of the problem not addressed in the
solution?
D. Strategies for the future
1. What long-range strategies could the organization adopt to prevent
similar problems in the future?
2. What other strategies would be adopted to prevent similar problems
experienced in other services?
In summary, case analysis should identify:
1. the system involved - primary components relevant to the situation under
study. Who are the principal players, what is their role, etc.?
2. the goals of the system components - each system or component of the system
has implied or explicit goals.
3. the behaviors, mechanisms, structures and strategies of the system
components. (Dooley, Skinner, 1977, pp. 277-289)
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D. ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE
The principal objective of this paper is to examine and determine from a
comparative perspective the organizational and institutional consequences that (1)
communications management.; (2) interoperability; (3) command structure; and (4)
standardization (e.g., rules of engagement) may have on the command and control
of military forces in conflict.
The primary causes for the failure or success of an operational 03 system
during combat are found in the organizational coherence and the institutional
flexibility achieved through the C3 doctrine and practices (Gissin, 1979, pp. 5-8)
The effects and consequences of technological military innovations can best be
understood by studying the practices of C3 during combat or crisis operations. The
environment of combat provides the best test for the operational chain of conmmand
and the organizational flexibility in executing a C3 doctrine.
This thesis will review the C3 doctrine and practices of the U.S. services in
conflicts dating back to the attack on the S.S. Mayaguez up to the present day
invasion of Grenada. No attempt is made to provide a detailed historical (or
chronological) account of specific battles or combat engagements. Rather, the focus
is on the principal problems of C3 encoun,red in each case and their consequences
for the U.S. military organization as a whole.
Due to the comparative nature of this thesis and its length, it is divided into
two parts. Part One deals with several important aspects of C3 doctrine. Chapter
2 will provide an overview with definitions of the concepts of communications
management, interoperability, command structure and standardization. Coalition
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warfare is part of the U.S.'s overall strategy, and examining different service
doctrines is essential to solving the complex problem of interoperability. Chapter
3 will provide a discussion of the Crisis Action System. It will also provide a brief
description of the roles and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in crisis management. Chapter 4 looks
at C2 in decision making and addresses the important concept of the structure of
the operational chain of command in decision making. Chapter 5 will discuss the
joint arena in today's military forces and describe how the Joint Task Force (JTF)
apparatus is organized.
Part Two of this paper then is a series of comparative case studies to be used
in a classroom environment to illustrate the four principle aspects of C3 doctrine
described above. Chapter 6 will look at the Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt to
examine and analyze what role unity of command, operational planning,
communications management, and decision making played in the failures and
successes experienced with the operation. Chapter 7 will examine the principles of
interoperability through a case study on the Grenada Invasion. Chapter 8 will
analyze the principles of command structure and standardization of C3 doctrine
through a case study on the raid on Libya. Chapter 9 will review the recapture of
the S.S. Mayaguez from the perspective of centralization of decision making in a
crisis with emphasis on command structure and operational planning.
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II. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN CONFLICT OVERVIEW AND DEFINITION
As in the case with the human central nervous system (CNS), a military C3
system can function well under routine conditions in peacetime, but fail when
damaged or under stress. In many ways, the C3 system accomplishes for a military
organization the functions that the CNS, including sensory organs, accomplishes for
a human. The human's eyes, ears, and other sensors gather information and flash
signals to the brain via a complex network of information channels. The brain,
while continuing to regulate routine functions, synthesizes these inputs with stored
data, filters out extraneous signals, makes decisions, and communicates messages
that control the activities of the legs, arms, etc. The military C3 system employs
intelligence sensors, communication links, stored data, information filters and
processors, and control procedures in pursuit of organizational goals. This
metaphoric description points out that there are a number of definitions, each
denoting different aspects of the C3 system.
The U.S. definition of C3 is comprehensive, but in practice, the supporting
subfunctions (e.g., communications, intelligence, automated procedures, electronic
warfare, etc.) are often treated as separate elements rather than as parts of an
overall concept. Studies and analysis of the subfunctions are numerous and varied,
but a comprehensive examination of the whole is lacking. The U.S. lacks a
commonly accepted frame of reference within which to address C3 issues. C3
program elements sometimes face difficulty in surviving budget cuts because it is
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difficult to relate them in an organizational fashion to positive military worth.
(Gissin, 1979, pp. 43-79)
The U.S. has extensive resources available for crisis management in support of
national interests. In distant areas, the U.S. can usually establish a superior ad hoc
C3 capability. Superior technology provides advantages in capacity, throughput and
size. U.S. space-based systems are characterized as reliable and technologically
superior to those of the Soviet Union. Satellite communication systems provide
worldwide coverage. Our worldwide base structure, plus greater access to friendly
facilities and wide ranging naval operations, provide the capability to quickly apply
intelligence and reconnaissance assets to crises areas. The same resources provide
high-capacity communications channels to the National Command Authority (NCA).
A. COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT - ITS ROLE IN C2
C3 is a field in which technology continues to change rapidly. Space, airborne,
ground-based and underwater sensors provide large amounts of information to and
from widespread areas of the world. High capacity communication systems transmit
information over great distances almost instantaneously. Computers and information
management techniques allow rapid processing and display of large amounts of
information. Finally, commanders have at their disposal long-range, accurate and
highly destructive weapons. Trends indicate that rapid advancement in C3
technology will continue.
The U.S. military is dependent more than ever on in-place, expensive C3
hardware which is difficult and costly to change. But change is not just limited by
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cost. As it is defined, C3 inherently is related to the management structure of
military organizations and reflects their fundamental organizational characteristic
way of doing business. Because it is so fundamental, C3 systems are less easily
changed than weaponry. (Gissin, 1977, pp. 195-211)
In general, C3 technology is often defined in terms of hardware facilities and
associated software. These include voice and digital radio communication systems,
command centers (fixed and mobile), radar systems, surveillance and intelligence
early warning systems (indications and warning systems or I&W refers to ground,
sea and airborne or spaceborne systems), data collection, and processing systems
(computers, electronic display consoles, manual displays, etc.) (Gissin, 1977, pg.
18). It is easy to distinguish between technological systems that are designed to
collect (I&W and surveillance), process (computers), and disseminate
(communications) information. Each of these sub-systems as part of the-whole C3
system permit a commander (at various echelons) to communicate with and perform
the functions of C2 with his forces and weapons systems. In the last 10-15 years,
rapid advancements in micro-electronics have made significant-contributions toward
the development of integrated C3 system hardware. Reliability, availability and
maintainability improvements have also had a significant impact on making systems
more compact and efficient (Gissin, 1977, pg. 19). Senior commanders at higher
echelons can now communicate directly in a secure mode with action elements,
receive reports and processed information, and transmit orders in near-real-time.
In an information rich environment, the role that communications plays in the C2
process is more important now than ever before. The problems faced by our
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military commanders is one where it is assumed that the procedures, personnel,
organizational arrangements and supporting technology are compatible and mutually
support each other. (Gissin, 1977, pg. 75)
For any given C3 structure, it is necessary to identify and systematize generic
communications functions. The communication process can be defined as consisting
of certain generic functions that are inherent to any C2 system at varying levels of
activity. This process consists of the following functions (Gissin, 1977, pp. 75-76):
1. gather information from various sources by electronic as well as human means
(the intelligence collection function);
2. organize, synthesize and process the information (data compilation,
translation of electronic signals to intelligence data, decoding. distribution to
different intelligence organizations for interpretation and evaluation);
3. evaluate the content of the processed information;
4. transmit orders and directions to operational units on the basis of that
information;
5. monitor the mission in progress and maintain communication with operational
forces;
6. receive timely feedback information from field units and distribute relevant
information and directions to appropriate echelons in a timely fashion
adjusting for the changing conditions and battlefield picture conveyed by the
feedback process.
It is important to note here that this list of generic functions exists at all levels
of command regardless of the level of conflict, branch of military service, and
weapon system employed (ground, air, naval). Just as there may be two different
combat units or two different warfare elements of the same combat unit, there will
be differences in these functions. For example, the relative priority given to each
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function in a combat situation, an assigned weapon system's ability to respond to
mission requirements, and the time available for information exchange are just a few
of the differences that may exist. The element of time becomes much more
constrained in a tactical air engagement than in an infantry or artillery engagement.
It is useful here to relate the relationship between doctrine and process. One
way to do this is by examining and analyzing the decision time cycle. The decision
time cycle for any given command structure is defined as:
the total amount of time it takes to execute the six generic functions of the
control and communications processes for a given force within a given level of
conflict and operational combat environment. (Gissin, 1977, pg 78)
Another way to look at it is by analyzing the time span involved in initiating
a decision, through its transmission (by some medium), execution by operational
forces, and reception of feedback (this is essential for allowing change or
modification to plans). At the strategic political level, the decision making process
is more complex than that at an operational-tactical level. The political-military
machinery includes separate organizations and structures, different perceived threats
and institutional and other relationships between the military and civilian
hierarchies. In addition, level and magnitude of C3 facilities impact the time
decision cycle. (Gissin, 1977, pg. 79)
At the operational-tactical level, the way a C3 doctrine is practiced or executed
will influence the decision time cycle of communications. In the context of two
opposing forces having equal C3 technology and capability, the important variables
that impact the decision time cycle are as follows (Gissin, 1977, pg. 80-82):
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* the institutional and organizational barriers that impede the communications
process; these may include a multi-level echelon command structure where
information follows the regular chain of command;
a flexibility of the C3 doctrine; does it incorporate, for example, flexible decision
guidelines and decision thresholds for operational units?
* type and style of planning military operations; pre-formatted, centralized and
detailed planning, for example, may limit the capacity for flexible response,
thus lengthening the decision time cycle.
As with the U.S. Navy's Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) doctrine,
which stresses the principle of "command by negation" to lower operational units,
flexible planning accelerates the decision time cycle and permits a quicker reaction
time. This doctrine serves to enhance command of lower echelons, but the down
side is that those at the top echelons will have less specific control. In summary, it
is important to understand that the C3 doctrine is affected by a number of
constraints which determine the decision time cycle of the communication process.
(Gissin, 1977, pg. 79)
B. INTEROPERABILITY - JOINT C3
Two definitions of interoperability are used by the Department of Defense:
Interoperability - 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services
to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The
condition achieved among communications-electronics equipment when
information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between
them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should 'be defined
when referring to specific cases. (Boyes, Andriole, 1987, pg. 383)
As evidenced by events over the last decade, U.S. military forces must be
capable of performing single service operations, joint service operations, and
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combined operations with allied nations. For the purposes of this paper, C3
interoperable systems are: those C3 personnel and equipments (including software)
which are used in joint/combined operations and, based on established requirements
(doctrine and/or standard operating procedures), are required to transfer
information among different U.S. services/allied forces. (Naval Research Advisory
Committee, 1987, pg.4)
Most military planners and strategists agree that it is unlikely that many
operations would be conducted by a single service. In fact, in the most recent
contingency operations, conscious decisions were made at the highest levels to give
all services a part of the action. The invasion of Panama may be one exception, but
the results are still under review (in fact, preliminary comments indicate that
Panama was successful because it was a single service venture). The U.S. military
has been challenged throughout history to operate effectively with each other and
its allies. Interoperability among U.S. services has never been needed more than
right now. It won't be until interoperability is achieved through examining doctrine,
planning, procedures, hardware and operational techniques among our own services,
that we can then begin to understand and analyze the complex problem of
interoperability with our allies. Needless to say, these interoperability issues must
be addressed simultaneously.
The success of joint and combined operations relies largely on the ability of C3
systems of the joined forces to interoperate effectively. Interoperability does not
stand alone. It reflects the dynamic integration of planning, training, doctrine,
procedures, force structure, experience and hardware. Identifying major
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interoperability requirements for deployed forces and their C3 systems requires an
examination of the experiences of actual contingency operation. In addition,
exercises, simulations and combat (analytical) modeling systems can ",e used to help
identify requirements. The bottom line in interoperability decisions is to determine
how much interoperability is required and what resources should be allocated to
achieve the requisite degree of interoperability.
Service doctrine to accomplish a given operational task (or mission) has a
significant impact on the interoperability requirements for C3 equipment and
procedures. Differences among services in their doctrinal approach has been
studied, examined and modified specifically in the employment of air assets (Naval
Research Advisory Committee, 1987, pg. 8). The selection of a C3 system and the
requirements for these systems must include a detailed review of the doctrine which
each service uses. Required operational capabilities (ROCs) are one procedure used
for establishing requirements. These are extended processes for establishing
requirements taking on the average one to two years form submission to
implementation. (Naval Research Advisory Committee, 1987, pg. 9)
Interoperability is commonly labeled as a hardware problem because most
interoperability problems are first realized in the failure of 03 equipment tO transfer
information. Differing doctrines, procedures and/or operator training also
contribute to lack of interoperability. Interoperability is basically an operational
rather than a design problem. Design certainly affects interoperability, but
interoperability is needed only under operational conditions. Lack of interoperability
becomes noticeable when the military attempts to carry out an operational task.
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Interoperability is much more than just a hardware problem. In addition to
hardware, military tactics, operating procedures, software language formats, and
personnel training must also be considered. This defines a management problem:
requirements must be established, standards which ersure meeting those
requirements must be specified and audited to assure compliance and total system
testing using hardware and software. Operators or users must also be involved by
testing the system in a real world scenario to validate interoperability performance
(Naval Research Advisory Committee, 1987, pg. ii). Commanders in chief (CINCs),
on whose shoulders this business of interoperability ultimately rests, must fight with
what they currently have and make the existing equipment and systems work. The
current emphasis appears to be on procuring new systems to solve interoperability
problems. In a quick response scenario, the only capability that counts is that which
gets in the hands of the users. The only interoperability that counts is the
interoperability that those same users have at hand at the time or in the near future
(Naval Research Advisory Committee, 1987, pg. ii).
Interoperability of both national and international forces is constantly changing
relationships. The most current example of this is the changing face of the NATO
and Warsaw Pact. It is obvious to the most casual observer that interoperability
problems will not be resolved all at once. There are several important items which
must be considered when trying to understand the interoperability problem (Boyes,
Andriole, 1987, pp. 382-388):
1. The Joint Tactical C3 Agency (JTC3A) was created by the DOD a few years
ago to ensure interoperability of tactical C3 systems for joint or combined
operations. Its charter is to develop and rAaintain joint architecture, interface
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standards and interface definitions. This effort was conducted to create a
management structure whose sole function is to address the interoperability
problems at the tactical level.
2. Common equipment is one method that will reduce interoperability problems.
Common language, common procedures and a common understanding of how
each other operates also contributes to the amelioration of the
interoperability problem.
3. Common standards are required to ensure interoperability. This will alleviate
any problems that might occur when systems developed-by different services
or other nations must be integrated.
4. Operational forces must share a common doctrine and tactics. Although it
is unlikely that this is achievable because of the world-wide nature of our
military commitments, educating other services or our allies in each others'
doctrines and procedures can provide huge dividends in the interoperability
of forces. Developing a joint doctrine is underway in the U.S..
C. COMMAND STRUCTURE: THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
Every -organization has a clearly defined hierarchy of echelons. A command
structure can be typified by the number of intermediate echelons between the
decision makers at the top echelon and the operational units near the bottom
echelon. Delegation of authority or allocation of responsibility among these various
levels of command are important characteristics of the command structure. Formal
authority is normally vested at the top echelon and is passed down the chain of
command. In addition, there is a clear distinction between the actual responsibilities
relegated to staff positions and line positions.
Unlike civilian business organizations, military orgamizations and their inherent
command, structures have significantly different peacetime daily operations from
those used in combat or wartime. Inpeacetime, daily routines are defined in clearly
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distinct patterns for both administrative and operational chairs-of-command. In war,
command structures undergo substantial modification in the delegation of authority
and responsibility (Gissin, 1977, pg. 51). For example, an army division commander
may have, during peacetime, complete control over the day-to-day operations and
training of his brigades. This includes maintenance, logistics, administration and
other responsibilities. When a contingency operation is underway, part of his
division can be transferred to the theatre and come under the direct and complete
control of the theater commander for combat operations and deployment of forces.
This arrangement is standard in all of the services. The navy's east coast squadrons
are under the administrative control of one commander (low numbered squadrons)
but change operational control and procedures (CHOP) to a different squadron
commander (high numbered) in the final stages of preparations for deployment.
U.S. Tactical Air Command provides training, preparation and combat. readiness of
U.S. based tactical air squadrons and transfers them to theater commanders to-meet
operational commitments abroad or in-response to crises.
An important distinctionexists between civilian and military organizations. In
the military, the command structure can be clearly differentiated between peace-
time (day-to-day operations) in-which the administrative and operational chains of
command follow a clear hierarchical pattern, and wartime (or combat readiness)
structures which require modification in the allocation of authority and responsibility
(Gissin, 1977, pg. 52).
Flexibility of a command structure can be defined as the manner and method
by which military organization transitions from a peacetime pattern to a high
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readiness pattern for combat (Gissin, 1979, pg. 53). Measuring the degree of
flexibility can be done by analyzing the length of the chain of command and the
range of delegated authority from the top echelon to the lower echelon. The greater
the number of intermediate echelons there are between the lower units and the top
echelon, the greater the limit will be on flexibility. A command structure where
lower operational combat units have a greater extent of authority will improve the
degree of flexibility (Gissin, 1979, pg. 53). One could imagine the amount of
flexibility an air warfare structure might have in a highly centralized command
structure versus one where unit commanders have the freedom to improvise as the
combat situations develop.
Each service (or military organization) has a different doctrine with respect to
how it makes the transition from peacetime operations to wartime operations. The
structures and practices used can vary from bypassing the chain of command -- a
concept called skipping echelons which will be addressed later in this thesis -- to
high doctrinal emphasis on centralized operational control (e.g., nuclear forces)
(Gissin, 1979, pg. 30). Advanced C3 technologies can significantly alter how the
distribution of authority and responsibility among different echelons in the command
structure of an operational unit is made. It becomes incumbent on those who study
C3 technology and develop C3 architectures to evaluate the benefits or troubles new
systems may have on how command structure patterns are affected. This is of
particular relevance to the contingency operations which will be presented in this
thesis.
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D. STANDARDIZATION IN C3 - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Many problems of C2 in combat operations are not technological in nature.
They are conceptual or organizational, or are entrenched in habit, tradition, or come
about from long standing ways of operating. Technology can help solve many of the
problems, but unless some of the problems' basic causes are understood, technology
can actually make things worse. Too much information is worse than too little.
Computer equipment and information processors which make information available
in vast quantities must also make it possible to sort out that which is important.
Otherwise, the commander and his staff may as well stick to manual methods.
A commander who is given his mission and the intent of his superior
commander and who has been delegated the authority and responsibility to decide
how to operate within that mission (and intent) will be more effective on the
battlefield, regardless of the concept of information flow (Gissin, 1979, pp. 263-267).
The elements of unpredictability and randomness face every commander.
Uncertainty and chaos is normal in war. Information flow in quantity is not
necessarily the answer for reducing uncertainty, however, standardization of
information in form (and content) often pays dividends toward increasing the
commander's decision making effectiveness.
Generating combat information cannot be burdensome for the battlefield
commander. It must be beneficial to that commander -- this will serve as an
incentive for him to provide it (Beal, 1985, pp. 5-21). The availability of detailed
information must not tempt a commander to demand more. Nor is it prudent to
issue orders which are appropriate matters for subordinates to decide. This concept
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involves an extraordinary level of mutual trust and confidence that information
shared will be used to achieve mission objectives and deny enemy exploitation.
It is understood that a rich information system is needed for ROE to succeed.
New and advanced technology in C3 systems are said to provide the commander
with improved remote control capabilities. But remote centralized control
capabilities can be constrained by the fact that the more complex and rapid-paced
the battle is, the more critical it is for the commander to have face-to-face briefings
with his subordinates prior to mission execution to ensure coordination and complete
understanding of common operation procedures (whether they be SOPs, ROEs or
combat tactics). There are numerous cases in the Vietnam Conflict where remote
control communications capabilities were poor substitutes for direct, face-to-face
communications. The operational doctrine of centralized control was practiced in
the air war over North Vietnam between 1965-1968. The consequences of restrictive
ROEs was increased friction between operational commanders and civilian decision
makers in Washington. Detailed ROEs in some instances, curtailed operational
flexibility. (Lane, 1981, pg 68-83)
In planning new C3 structures, the enhanced control and communications they
provide for senior commanders have to be mitigated by the operational ROEs and
procedures (based on the particular characteristics of the combat environment) and
by a realistic assessment of the utility provided by the centralized C3 technological
capabilities. Command and control technological capabilities may simply be limited
by the rules of engagement which may require procedures and modes of operation
that are adverse to what the technology permits. (Gissin, 1979, pg. 122)
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III. CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM
A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS
There are a whole range of crises that could potentially face a government.
They could mark the beginning of a major conflict (which is postulated to occur in
Europe). They could be confrontations between superpowers like the U.S.
experienced over Cuba in 1962. They could be Soviet sponsored conflicts, third
world conflicts, terrorist incidents, hostile action incidents, military incursions or
damaging economic moves. Some are more politically motivated than others, while
others can be of a transient-nature. In this country, our military command structure
is designed for major campaigns in terms of its vertical organization, planning
structure and overall military strategies. (Hilton, 1985, pp. 147-178)
As a means of comparison, the attributes of a major campaign include: clear
initiation of the event, known enemy objectives, predetermined U.S. objectives,
predetermined U.S. military strategy, and less precise NCA control of the operations.
On the other hand, the characteristics of a crisis include: ambiguous initiating event,
unknown enemy objectives, U.S. objectives defined at the time of the crisis,
alternatives and options explored at many levels, and NCA demands of precise
control of operations (Stilwell, 1982, pg. 134).
Crises involve requirements which are, in most instances, superimposed on
routine day-to-day activities. They usually generate greater pressure on executives
and their staffs. Often enough, U.S. security and prestige are on the line. Decisions
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made are time-sensitive, face the element of uncertainty, and usually are irreversible
(due to political constraints). Co-ordination among civil agencies also faces certain
time constraints and is often very complex. Every crisis is different and requires a
greater need for decisiveness and consistency -- to maintain control and avoid
confusion. These general characteristics are dependent on intensity and duration of
the crisis at hand. Usually a crisis involves the President of the U.S., and decisions
have to be made without the benefit of long review and analysis. This points to the
importance of pre-planning, exercise activity and staffing. (Stilwell, 1982, pg. 130)
The first report of crisis, which may come from places other than a U.S.
embassy or military command, often contains only sketchy information. Time
becomes a critical and sensitive element as (at the national level) the search for
additional information gets started. The search for information goes out in all
directions in an attempt to initiate the process for developing a plan. Usually pre-
planned responses are not appropriate, and the NCA has a tendency to jump the
chain of command (Hilton, 1982, pg. 135). This tendency is often acceptable in the
quest for information, but many military analysts feel that it could be disastrous if
combat is involved (Hilton, 1982, pg. 135).
B. ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE JCS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
A crisis is defined as:
.an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories
and possessions that rapidly develops and creates a condition of such
diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance to the U.S. Government
that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to
achieve U.S. national objectives. (Boyes, Andriole, 1987, pg. 249)
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A crisis receives intense media attention, and because time can be so sensitive,
everyone wants to resolve the crisis in a hurry. The Iranian Hostage Crisis was an
exception to this generality. Time is often considered sensitive because a crisis can
quickly escalate. National tension is usually high, and military force is either
threatened and/or used.
The occurrence of crises is on the rise. Between the 1950s and the 1970s,
crises occurred on the average of one per year. In the mid-1970s, the average
jumped to three per year. Over the 1980s, the average was nearly six per year.
Most of these events (over 80 percent) have occurred in places where U.S. military
forces were not in place. As a result, each military response needed to take in
whatever C3 system that would be needed. This posed a unique and demanding
challenge for C3 planners. Users of C3 systems are increasing the demand for more
control, coverage and connectivity. Redundancy and availability of equipment to
meet these needs are some of the constraints faced by suppliers. (Boyes, Andriole,
1987, pg. 249)
There are six requirements for crisis management: a basic organization,
accurate and timely intelligence, integrated communications, experienced decision
makers, data processors/analysts and their supporting staffs, standardized procedures
and command and control (Hilton, 1985, pg. 163). The JCS has a number of key
responsibilities relative to-crisis action (which are contained in Title 10 U.S. Code,
DOD directives, and JCS Pub 4) and are listed below (Hilton, 1985, pg. 164):
* monitor world-wide activities; identify potential crisis areas;
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* review military plans for adequacy, feasibility and suitability or develop new
plans as necessary;
* prepare estimates of situation; develop alternative courses of action/options;
state risks;
* provide military advice, options and information to the NCA;
* provide strategic direction to armed forces;
* assign logistic responsibilities to military services and Defense Logistics Agency;
* recommend changes in priorities and reallocation of forces/resources required;
* supervise implementation of integrated plans for military mobilization;
* provide joint intelligence for use within DOD;
* issue operational directives.
The JCS has been closely involved in developing a framework of the Crisis
Action System. First, when there is an occurrence of an event (as it fits the
definition), a report will be made to the NMCC/JCS. In fact, there are a number
of intervening echelons and other agencies that are included in this reporting
process. At one of these echelons, the media is usually made aware of the event.
The report is then assessed by the JCS, and some preliminary options are developed.
Establishing crisis staffing procedures is undertaken by the JCS with coordintion
between the military services, other departments/agencies and possibly White House
involvement. Next, the JCS will issue a warning order to the unified or specified
commanders and a range of response options is developed. The alert order is the
final course of action selected by the NCA/JCS. The JCS crisis action planning
stops -with the -order to execute and deploy forces. From here the unified or
specified commanders take over and are-responsible for operation order (OPORD)
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execution and deployment of major forces. This is considered a major element of
crisis action because the orders the unified or specified commander gives, and the
moves made in engagement, often serve to restrain a crisis, keeping it at the lowest
possible level (highly desirable by crisis planners) (Hilton, 1985, pg. 166). Here the
crisis either ends or escalates to the next higher level. If it escalates, reinforcement
is often required. If it is resolved, then forces are redeployed.
The unified and specified commanders are considered the cornerstone of the
crisis action system. They have responsibility for the military operations in their
areas of responsibility (AOR) and provide the JCS with vital, on-the-scene reporting
and local knowledge. It is the CINC who develops the options from which the final
course of action is selected by the NCA in conjunction with the JCS. The National
Military Command Center (NMCC) is the hub of the crisis action (on military
action).
C. CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION MAKING IN CRISIS
In a major study which analyzed over 200 U.S. crisis operations occurring
between 1946 - 1975, it was discovered that the president was involved in over 73
percent of the crises although this involvement was "legally" required in only 22
percent of them. In addition, the study found that centralization of decision making
at the NCA level still required extensive interagency co-ordination in over 58 percent
of the crises, while only 22 percent of them legally required it. The conclusion
reached in this study was that presidential decision making and bureaucratic co-
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ordination slowed down the response in such a way as to actually create additional
military crisis management problems. (Gissin, 1979, pg. 217)
Despite the apparent effort to. centralize control of crisis operation and an
increased involvement of top decision makers in the detailed planning of military
operations, it is not clear that the ends justify the means. In other words, it is clear
from the literature that centralized control does not guarantee or necessarily result
in improved management and increased readiness. While past crises can be broadly
categorized (e.g., evacuation of U.S. citizens), many are unique in their major
elements: i.e., location, force status and readiness, communication facilities and
capabilities, political setting, timing and human factors. A unique crisis often
requires a unique solution. In addition to strict secrecy maintained by crisis
planners, events tend to develop or unfold very rapidly. All these features of crisis
operations serve to complicate C3 plaming. Consistent C3 doctrine, standard
operating procedures (e.g., ROE) and a basic education in C2 for operational and
senior echelons are considered critically important in crisis operations. Merely
having technological solutions to the communication and control problems is not
enough. Close attention must be paid to organizational and institutional problems
to better produce response and control mechanisms in crises situations. (Gissin,
1979, pg. 219)
Crisis action planning is described in the Joint Operation Planning System
(JOPS) Volume IV. Like JOPS, Volumes I through III, which describe the
deliberate planning process, it is driven by Defense Guidance. It uses the same
methodical and iterative format found in the OPLANs which are prepared by unified
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and specified commanders. In Volume IV, the element of time is compressed into
days and hours. The major features of crisis planning that make it quite different
from deliberate planning is the number of people involved, the time within which to
plan and execute the action, and the frequency of crisis planning activities. From
a C3 perspective, another difference is the level of dependence on deployable
systems for C2 connectivity. (Boyes, Andriole, 1987, pg. 250)
D. THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE OSD
If a major crisis arises, the OSD staff must be able to take off its normal hat
of policy formulation and review and get with the business of handling the major
requirements of the crisis. The SECDEF wears a military hat (next to the president)
in his role as member of the NCA. He also has a very important function to
perform as head of an executive department. The ability of our military forces to
mobilize, marshal,, deploy and to be supported and sustained is a function of the
ability to get non-defense departments of the executive branch and the industrial
base together to do that. The SECDEF has a tremendous number of functions to
perform above and beyond pure war-fighting. (Stilwell, 1985, pg. 51)
A crisis management system was developed to plug the gap in the DOD. Its
principles include using existing OSD staff organization and relationships,
maintaining current responsibilities and authority structures, allowing decisions-to be
made at the lowest level, complementing the SECDEF's military-staff and providing
a focal point for OSD activities. The OSD crisis management system has 5 boards,
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12 committees, a crisis co-ordination group, a crisis analysis group and a crisis
management council. (Stilwell, 1985, pg. 55)
The OSD crisis management system maintains its primary command cell within
the Pentagon and can use crisis action elements in the JCS arena. If the OSD was
vulnerable and had to deploy, it would either deploy to the Alternate National
Military Command Center or the National Emergency Airborne Command Post
(NEACP.) In addition to deploying to either alternate, the JCS crisis center could
accommodate the OSD team. (Stilwell, 1985, pg. 57)
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IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DECISION MAKING
It is useful to examine the C2 process from the perspective of decision making.
Decision making can be defined as "the process of identifying and selecting a course
of action to solve a specific problem or take advantage of an opportunity." (Stoner,
Freeman, 1989, pg. 165) A commander's decision provides the framework within
which other organization members make their decisions and act. Problem soving
and decision making are considered key parts of a commander's activities. They play
a particularly crucial role when the commander is involved in planning. I-fanning
often involves the more significant and long-range decisions that a commander
makes. The planning process requires almost a continual series of decision making
situations, and it is the quality of these decisions which shape how effective a plan
is. (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 165)
Decision making styles and approaches are wide and diverse, and often must
be tailored to fit the specific circumstances. Effective decision makers do not merely
wait for a problem to arise; they actively look for problems and opportunities to
solve them. (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 186) Commanders make decisions with
va,-ing amounts of information, about conditions that are not always under their
control. It is useful to consider approaching decisions as though they were being
made under conditions of certainty, risk or uncertainty. Formal problem solving
processes are used by most decision-makers because they provide a "rational set of
procedures for solving problems." (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 187) Prioritizing
32
problems or ranking them in order of importance is also an important element of
decision making. It helps a decision maker decide which problems will get their full
and immediate attention (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 187).
A. UNITY OF COMMAND AND DELEGATION
The unity of command principle is a guideline for delegation that states that
each individual in an organization should report to only one superior (Stoner,
Freeman, 1989, pg. 312). Reporting to more than one superior makes it difficult for
an individual to know to whom he/she is accountable and whose instructions to
follow. Reporting to more than one superior is also considered to encourage
individuals to avoid responsibility, since they can easily blame poor performance on
the fact that with several-bosses, they simply have too much-to do (Stoner, Freeman,
1989, pg. 313).
The delegation of authority by superiors to subordinates is necessary for the
efficient functioning of any organization because no superior can personally
accomplish or completely supervise all of the organizations, activities or tasks
(Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 310). The extent to which a superior delegates authority
(and accountability) is influenced by such factors as the culture of the organization,
the specific situation involved, and the relationships, personalities and capabilities
of the people involved (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 311).
When used properly, delegation of authority has several important advantages.
One advantage is that it can lead to better decisions since-subordinates close to the
"firing line" are likely to have a clearer view of the facts and situation (Stoner,-
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Freemen, 1989, pg. 314). Effective delegation also speeds up decision making.
Valuable time can be lost when subordinates must check with the "chain of
command" before making a decision. This lost time can be eliminated when lower
levels of an organization are authorized to make the necessary decisions on the spot
(or as the situation warrants). As was stated in the section on crisis management,
the element of time is critical. In addition, delegation can cause lower echelons (or
subordinates) to accept accountability and exercise judgement. This not only serves
to train the lower echelon, but also improves self-confidence and willingness to take
initiative. (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 314)
Delegation is closely related to decentralization in the sense that the greater
amount of decentralization-for any organization depends on external environmental
forces, the organization's size and its culture (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 324). The
advantages of decentralization are similar to those of delegation: unburdening top
decision makers; improved decision making because decisions are maJe closer to the
action; better training, morale and initiative at lower levels; and more flexibility and
faster decision making in rapidly changing environments. But, total decentralization
with no coordination and leadership from the-top would clearly be undesirable. The
very purpose of organization would be defeated without some form of centralized
control. (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 324)
Advancements in information technology make it easier-to decentralize. These
advancements in information systems allow some processes to be centrally
controlled, but permit decentralizing decision-making to those echelons closest to the
action. As the U.S. military goes through its restructuring, the trend toward
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decentralization will undoubtedly create some debates. Information system
technology, while making decentralization in vogue, can also mean more
sophisticated centralized control systems. (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 321)
B. ECHELON SKIPPING
The capabilities that are provided by advanced information system (C3)
technologies enable senior commanders to reach down the chain of command and
communicate directly with action level units in order to gain information or quick
response from those forces (Gissin, 1979, pg. 238). When this command bypassing
(or skip-echelon) is used extensively by senior commanders without adjustments to
the doctrine, or adjustments in the allocation of authority and responsibility in the
operational chain of command, any error could have potentially disastrous results
(Gissin, 1979, pg. 30). In addition, it can produce tensions among intermediate (or
successive) levels, contribute to confusion and conflicting reports, and deprive senior
commanders with important information available at the intermediate levels (Gissin,
1979, pg. 30).
Refinements in C3 technology have enhanced the ability for senior echelons
to get closer to real time contact with operations. Real time high echelon battle
management is possible, but it can also mean that those at the bottom might hold
back information to prevent the higher echelons from getting the temptation to
make tactical decisions. (Beal, 1984, pg. 14)
Uncertainty is one thing that every echelon in the chain of command must
contend with. Information denial creates higher levels of uncertainty. Synthesized
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and integrated information reduces this uncertainty. Information systems which
support C2 are characterized by horizontal information flow. A commander at
whatever echelon who delegates authority and establishes accountability expects
feedback. This delegated authority feedback loop is what the top decision maker
wants to know most about. Once he is denied information, the tendency is to start
looking at tactical matters because they will be the ones he can look at without the
integrated information needed to make macro-level decisions. (Beal, 1984, pg. 10-
15)
It is suggested here that the relationships between successive echelons in the
chain of command and the strong bonds of trust and confidence between senior and
operational commanders, may be negatively affected by excessive use of advanced
C3 technology to skip echelons. The number of echelons that can be skipped
without creating information abnormalities varies according to the chain of command
size and the C3 doctrine used by an organization. Clearly this issue is one which
can produce adverse consequences if not carefully cc:' ri..d. (Gissin, 1979, pg.
311)
C. DECISION MAKING THRESHOLDS - SPAN OF CONTROL
Span of control refers to the number of subordinates who report directly to a
given superior (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 293). Early researchers tried to establish
a universal rule concerning how many subordinates one .person could effectively
supervise. Today, it is recognized that the optimum number varies with the situation
(Stoner, Freeman, pg. 294). In a military environment, this implies that effective
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command of personnel is constrained by the span of control of a commander. The
solution that most modern military organizations adapted was (similar to that
proposed by Carl von Clausewitz) the staff system. This system permits a
commander to retain his command privileges while maintaining his span of control
through a staff that monitors and supervises other activities (e.g., personnel) (Gissin,
1979, pg. 165). Actually, the concept of using advisory staffs by decision makers is
recorded throughout history. A staff provides a wide variety of expert help through
planning research, analysis, options development, policy implementation, monitoring
and control of certain functions. (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 309)
With advancements in modern C3 system technology and the increased
complexity of warfare, the size and diversity of a staff can become very large.
Consequently, a commander may be required to spread his span of cc arol over a
large number of staff specialists and subordinate operational commanders. Despite
the advantage of having a "shorter" chain of command, the commander may be
facing less direct contact or command relationships with his combat commanders.
Diverting more of one's span of control to a staff will undoubtedly improve
effectiveness of transmission of orders and directives, but there are trade-offs. As
Clausewitz states:
There is no denying that the supreme command of an army is markedly simpler
if orders only need to be given to three or four men; yet a general has to pay
dearly for that convenience in two ways. First, an order progressively loses
speed and vigor and precision the longer the chain of command it has to travel.
Second, a general's personal power and effecti'veness diminishes in proportion
to the increase in the sphere of action of his closest subordinates. (Gissin,
1979, pg. 165)
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Decision thresholds define the limits of authority and decision making
responsibility of a given echelon in the operational chain of command (Gissin, 1979,
pg. 55). These decision thresholds can vary from highly detailed and structured to
flexible and open. It depends a great deal on the traditions and doctrines of an
organization as well as type of mission, availability and accuracy of intelligence, level
of accepted risk and uncertainty, and political issues of concern (Gissin, 1979, pg.
56). Rigid and structured decision thresholds restrict the amount of discretionary
authority given to on-scene commanders, whilkflexible and open decision thresholds
provide wider latitude to operational combat echelons in making tactical decisions.
The flexible and open decision thresholds also foster independent decisions which
permit the on-scene commander to seize the moment and initiate action based on
the unpredictability of combat (Gissin, 1979, pg. 57). Whether a military
organization centralizes its detailed planning at the top or sees that every plan is a
basis for change is a function of its general operational philosophy of planning
military operations (Gissin, 1979, pg. 58).
D. ROLE OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN DECISION MAKING
A decision support system (DSS) is an interactive computer system that is
easily accessible to, and operated by, noncomputer specialists to assist them in
planning and decision making functions (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 672). The
decision making function allows the user to simulate problems using formal
mathematical models (e.g., combat models) and to test the outcomes of various
alternatives for reaching the best possible solution (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 673).
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While DSSs are currently being widely adopted, the development of expert systems
(ES) are the newest trend in tools for improving organizational decision making and
control (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 674). Expert systems are also called "knowledge-
based" systems since they are built on a framework of known facts and responses to
situations. These systems are also called "artificial intelligence" (AI) which refers to
the use of computers to simulate characteristics of human thought by developing
computational approaches to intelligent behavior (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 675).
Expert systems perform similarly to human experts. They can diagnose
problems, recommend alternative solutions, offer justification for their
recommendations and learn from previous experience by adding information gained
in solving problems &., their data base (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 675). The
application of computer technology to management of information and decision
support systems has a profound effect on how tasks are performed and how
organizations behave (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 680). The principal effect is that
organizations can process-and create paperwork with increasing accuracy and speed.
The roles of superiors and subordinates and the structure of the organization may
also be affected, but in most studies, it was found that computerization tends to lead
to an increase in the number of echelons. Access to information can also strengthen
the positions of subordinates (Stoner, Freeman, 1989 pg. 680).
In a review of the literature on the subject of DSS and computerization, it was
found that computer-based information systems do not necessarily greatly affect
organizational structures. In fact, in some cases, they reinforce existing structures.
While computerization can increase "top-down" communication and top-level
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monitoring of operation activities (steps toward centralization), it also provides for
decentralization at middle echelons through interorganiational networking. (Stoner,
Freeman, 1989, pg. 681)
Effective planning, decision making and control are based on effective
management of information. All military organizations have formal and informal
information systems. Computer-based information systems like DSS are evolving to
ES (AI), but the value of information supplied by these systems depends on quality,
quantity, timeliness and relevance to action (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 683). The
information needs of individuals differs with their hierarchial level. Top echelons
require information for strategic planning. Thus, their information sources are
largely external. Middle echelons need both internal and external sources, and
generally require more rapid information flow. Lower level echelons (tactical) are
concerned with operational control and need frequent, highly detailed and accurate
information -- predominantly from internal sources (Stoner, Freeman, 1989, pg. 684).
Application of computer based DSS or AI systems is promising for the'future and
may bring about fundamental changes in the way C2 of forces is performed. It is
important to understand the effects that advancements and applications from the
continuing computer revolution may have on military organizations. Needless to say,
computers can liberate one from many boring and routine tasks, giving the
opportunity to use information more creatively and productively.
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E. ORGANIZATIONAL AND INFORMATIONAL DECISIONS
Operational commanders assume that the decisions they make will be
operationally oriented because they result in orders and directives to subordinates
to-achieve specific operational objectives. These operational decisions are viewed
by the commander as the "basic stuff of the function of command." Prior to making
any operational decision, a commander will have made decisions of two other types:
organizational and informational. Organizational decisions establish a chain of
command for the execution of operational decisions. Organizational decisions also
establish the structure for the flow of information and for intermediate processing
of information required for decision making. Information decisions are those
decisions made by a commander based on what he believes the situation to be.
These decisions usually precede the operational decision about what action should
be taken. (Boyes, Andriole, 1987, pg. 18)
Organizational decisions establish command and reporting relationships that
create communications requirements -- not only in the physical sense, but in a
common language, too. Organizational decisions help shape C3 system development,
and because they commit C3 resources, commanders need to be aware of
capabilities and limitations of the C3 resources at subordinate levels (Boyes,
Andriole, 1987, pg. 18). C3 systems are generally devoted to supporting information
decisions.
Information seldom moves directly from sensor to decision maker without
filtering, correlation and analysis. These intermediate "nodes" are an-important part
of the C2 process. Removing redundant reports, or those that are not relevant, is
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an important control mechanism. Correlation of information is essential to reduce
any of the uncertainty that may surround conflicting reports. Correlation attempts
to establish positions, courses, speeds, identities, and even readiness -- by relating
several reports on the same target. Drawing inferences from these correlations as
to what an enemy's intentions might be is equally important in this process. Often
the C3 organization that does this business of filtering, correlating and analyzing is
not in direct control of the ultimate decision maker. It is therefore essential to
ensure that similar priorities are shared between all levels in this process. (Boyes,
Andriole, 1987, pg. 20)
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V. COMMAND AND CONTROL POLICIES -- THE UNIFIED AND JOINT ARENAS
Unified operations and joint actions generate certain unique C2 requirements:
integrating efforts toward a common objective, planning and conducting operations
under unified direction, developing doctrine for preparing and training for specific
types of combat actions, and defining responsibilities and developing doctrine for
unified operations (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 96). The principle of support is considered
extremely important in conducting joint or unified operations. This principle states
that forces of one service shall be trained and, as necessary, be eniployed to support
and supplement another service in carrying out its functions (Cardwell, 1984, pg
96). The principle of full utilization of forces includes: strategic direction of the
armed forces, unified command operation of forces, integration of the military
services into an efficient land, naval and air team, prevention of unnecessary
duplication and overlapping of effort among forces, and co-ordination of operations
to avoid gaps and maximize efficiency (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 97).
There are a number of factors which are considered when determining the
most effective method to coordinate the forces of two or more services. First, a
comparison should be made as to the mission to be accomplished with the
capabilities and functions of the services involved. Second, the geographic location
,and nature of anticipated level of operation must be considered. Third, the
character, strength and capabilities of the U.S. force versus those of the enemy
should be examined. Finally, a decision must be made to determine the nature and
43
size of the forces to be furnished by each service and type of command involved
(Cardwell, 1984, pg. 97).
The functions involved in a military action define the service identity of the
commander. Normally, missions requiring operations of one service force will be
assigned to the component commander of that service. The exact role of each
service in future conflicts cannot be fully predicted, and assignments of primary
functions are not intended to be "written in stone" with regard to command structure
or other relationships. In the event of a major emergency in his AOR, a unified
commander is authorized to assume temporary operational control (OPCON) of all
forces (unless those forces have been previously committed). (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 97)
A joint task force (JTF) is a force composed of assigned or attached elements
of the U.S. Army (USA), U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Navy (USN), and U.S.
Marine Corps (USMC), or two or more of these services. It is constituted by the
SECDEF or by a unified or specified commander. A JTF, unlike a subordinate
component command, is not a permanent command arrangement. The JTF is
established when the mission has a specific limited objective and is "dissolved when
the purpose for which it was created has been achieved." (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 62)
Like a component command, the commander of a JTF exercises OPCON over his
entire force (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 78).
A. COMPARISON OF U.S. SERVICE DOCTRINES
The Navy and Air Force view combat and war fighting from a theater point-of
view. The Army views combat in a context where the corps is the highest tactical
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fighting element, but the Army fully supports the concept of an echelon above the
corps level (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 30). The Marine Corps views combat from the
position of a single service performing a single assigned mission. The Marine Corps
perspective is that of an "integrated, combined arms force -- the Marine air-ground
task force -- which is task organized to perform a specific mission." (Cardwell, 1984,
pg. 35) It is these somewhat differing views of how forces should be organized for
theater warfare that the services bicker about, and their written doctrine support
these opinions (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 41).
Naval forces are arranged to conduct sea control and power projection. Air
Force structures are designed to support surface (land and sea environments)
operations and to execute the air mission. All of the services espouse the principle
of unity of effort which specifies that military forces should be "integrated into an
efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 40)
Each service applies the principle of unity of effort somewhat differently. The
Army, Air Force, and Navy agree that one single commander (theater or joint force)
should exercise OPCON of theater assets through his component commanders (i.e.,
land, naval and air component commanders). The Marine Corps believes that its
combat forces should report directly to the theater or joint commander and be
employed by the USMC component commander (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 41). The Navy
and Marine Corps believe in a service component (USA, USAF, USN and USMC),
while the Axmy and Air Force believe in functional components (air, land and naval)
(Cardwell, 1984, pg. 38).
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The Army and Air Force believe that land forces should come under the land
component, air forces under the air component, and naval forces under the naval
component (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 38). Both agree that the Marines should come
under the naval component in amphibious operations (or in those actions in support
of naval campaigns). They also agree that Marine forces should be assigned to
OPCON of the land component when assigned to sustained actions.
The Navy believes that all naval assets, including navy air, should report
through the naval component commander. This includes when naval air assets are
deployed over land in support of the airland battle -- that is, they would only operate
in a support role (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 35). The Navy supports the concept of a
single aviation assets manager. The Marines support the principle of the unity of
effort but-only through a marine force component commander. When operating in
an amphibious role, the marine forces would come under the naval component or
unified commander (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 37). The Marine Corps does not agree in
the concept of a single commander for air unless that commander is the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force Commander (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 37).
All four services agree with the principles of combat and war fighting as
delineated in JCS publications, but apply these principles in varying ways. These
differing perspectives have contributed to the current lack of a coherent command
structure which is based on the unity of command principle (Cardwell, 1984, pg. 44).
To accomplish war fighting objectives (assigned by political entities), a theater
command needs a coherent approach. This approach requires, at a minimum, a
detailed knowledge of warfare, service doctrine, tactics, own force capabilities,
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enemy force capabilities and histnry. If U.S. doctrine is to support military
objectives, then command structures for theater warfare need to be aimed toward
a unified approach. (Cardwell, 1984, p,. 72)
B. THE JOINT TASK FORCE APPARATUS
In establishing a YTF, the establishing authority usually notifies the appointed
Task ForceCommander whether sufficient qualifiec ,!fcers can be made available
to form a JTF staff or whether augmentation of his existing staff by officers of other
services is to be the basis for creating the joint staff (AFSC Pub 1, 1984, pg. 28).
The JTF commander has full OPCON of all forces assigned. This OPCON permits
him to assign tasks, designate objectives, and direct the operational aspects- of an
operation. It includes the authority to vary the internal task organization of' his
force (AFSC Pub 1, 1984, pg. 137). When the specific limited objective has been
accomplished, the fIF is dissolved and the assigned forces usually revert to their
former status.
This next section will address the issue of jointness among the military services.
The author believes that although four-service joint operations are practical where
joint control is required because of geographic span of theatre and, encompassing
both naval and continental operations, operational effectiveness and efficiency can
be impaired when jointness is overused. There are many low level conflict situations
where maximum service participation -may not always be the best option. As past
operations point out, mission requirements could have been met and better, served
without-resorting to a four/multi-service joint operation. Unfortunately, there seems
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to be a mind set in the unified command structure that maintains that all military
operations must have all four services represented. This mindset causes a service
component's capability to conduct a broad range of missions to be ignored or
duplicated for sake of maximum service participation and as a result, operational
effectiveness and efficiency can suffer.
For the sake of clarity, the author is not advocating single component
operations as a rule, nor is the suggestion to dismantle the joint structure. On the
contrary, the overall joint concepts of pursuing national security goals is valid and
makes a lot of sense, under certain conditions.
The criterion for determining force mix should be mission requirements.
Planners and decision makers on the Joint Staff or the Unified Command Staff in
their review of operations or contingency plans or during crisis situations must
evaluate each service's participation and use only that service component whose
capability best fulfills mission requirements. There are numerous scenarios which
lend themselves to the capabilities of only one or two service components,
particularly in crisis situations. If service component capability is ignored or
duplicated for the sake of having maximum service participation, mission
accomplishment can be jeopardized. (Wilson, 1984, pg. 1)
Maximum service participation in joint operations is necessary and practical
where joint control is required due to the geographical span of the theatre. Since
World War II, geo-political realities have forced the U.S. into simultaneously being
a global maritime and continental power. This situation requires that our military
be prepared to wage both naval and continental warfare, with the Army and Air
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Force oriented toward continental warfare, and the Navy, Marine Corps team
oriented towards naval warfare. The task that is faced by military planners is how
and when to integrate continental and naval forces in response to a mission. (Wilson,
1984, pg. 4)
To overcome what has been termed an over-jointness problem, there are
several considerations that should be made. First, the functions involved in an
operation -- military or continental -- should determine the nature of the forces
involved. When and where possible, a unified commander should make use of
existing service-developed skills. Second, the command element of a joint force
should possess the skills and doctrinal expertise to deal with the nature of the
operation. This is best achieved by assigning command of the JTF to a commander
of the service component possessing the best means of achieving the operational
objective. Finally, it is essential to develop joint doctrinal guidance for integrating
the functional capabilities of the components into a cohesive concept of operations
that can be used by joint planners and decision makers. (Wilson, 1984, pg. 5)
C. DEVELOPING C3 DOCTRINE
From a C2 point of view, effective use of the potential capabilities of the
newest weapons systems is a function of the ability of a combat organization to
develop a flexible, operational C3 doctrine. What is meant by a flexible doctrine is
one that would strike a balance between the requirements for centralized ccntrol
and the demands for flexibility and command authority to lower combat echelons.
Developing such a doctrine faces certain constraints. First, are the complexities and
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uncertainties of future battlefield conditions. Second, are the seemingly conflicting
requirements posed by different weapons systems technologies under development.
Growing complexity of weapons systems and the requirement for interoperability
between different service components seem to mandate a centralized control system.
On the other hand, with the ever-increasing action-reaction cycle, constant
improvements in air-launched/ground-based weapons, and more sophisticated C3
counter measures, a flexible operational doctrine which encourages lower combat
echelons to seize the initiative and carry out improvised military action makes more
sense. (Gissin, 1979, pp. 158-159)
At a minimum, it is apparent thai a flexible, operational C3 doctrine would
require planners and commanders to develop operational procedures which would
allow lower combat echelons to function with minimum essential communications.
Planners of military operations must somehow understand the uncertainties and risks
associated with a dynamic battlefield environment. Communications are vulnerable
to exploitation, disruption, physical attack and interruption. They can also suffer
from information overload which reduces response time. In planning for future
combat, the issue of "probable system breakdown" must be considered. It is the
author's opinion that too many of the military planners tasked with C2 ignore this,
maintaining the false assumption of a low probability assigned to the vulnerability
of C3 systems. (Gissin, 1979, pp. 151-157)
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VI. CASE STUDY NUMBER ONE
A. IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT - OPERATION EAGLE CLAW
1. Introduction
On the morning of 24 April 1980, in an Iranian desert approximately 265
miles from the city of Teheran, a team of 130 Army Green Berets, Rangers, drivers
and translators, and 50 pilots and air crewmen aborted their mission to rescue 53
Americans being held hostage by militant Iranian students. The decision to abort
was made by Colonel Charles A. Beckwith, USA, the on-scene commander. The
events leading up to this decision are the subject of this case. The rescue attempt,
also known as-the "debacle in the desert," left eight U.S. servicemen dead along with
the abandonment of five helicopters, weapons, communication equipment, classified
documents and maps. Of the military operations conducted by the U.S. between
1970 and 1984, none so clearly marked the decline of American military prestige and
competence as the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the 53 Americans being held
hostage in the U.S. embassy in Teheran. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 85)
The unsuccessful mission in Iran seemed to dramatize the inability of U.S.
military planners to devise and execute an operation for which they had nearly six
months to plan for. In the days immediately following the attempted raid, the press,
the American -public, the Pentagon, and the U.S. government blamed the-failure on
bad luck (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 85). In the years that followed, when classified
51
information on the mission became accessible to public viewing, it then became
much clearer that the failures experienced by the task force had little to do with bad
luck (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 86).
The mechanical failures and other equipment shortfalls that plagued the
mission seemed to indicate that the U.S. had lost its technological edge. The world
wondered how a country that could land a man on the moon and was among the
most technologically advanced could fail to fly eight helicopters 540 miles against no
enemy opposition, and suffer equipment failures that resulted in a mission abort.
Furthermore, once having made the decision to abort, the U.S. military could not
even evacuate the area without killing its own soldiers, or leave undetected. When
it was all over, the impact of the failed raid contributed to President Carter's demise
in the White House. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 3)
2. Background
In November 1979, the American embassy in Teheran was attacked and
captured by a band of Iranian Revolutionary Guards. They were considered the
most militant and radical arm of the Ayatollah Khomeini. As the hostage situation
dragged on, the Ayatollah took full advantage of the U.S. reluctance to take direct
action against Iran and gained domestic and international propaganda attention. In
the early days of Iran's revolution, there were still factions of moderates within the
government who repeatedly promised that the hostages would not be harmed and
would attain release through diplomatic means. President Carter was committed to
a peaceful solution and openly rejected the use of military force to rescue the
hostages or punish the new regime. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 86)
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From the very beginning though, officials within Carter's administration
encouraged military action. The military did not possess any sort of contingency
plan to deal with a situation that arose in Teheran. Furthermore, the Pentagon and
staff of the JCS did not have any planning organization to deal with a "commando-
style raid." Later, when the decision was made to initiate military action, a staff
structure within the JCS had to be created. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 5)
In November 1979, the White House directed the JCS to assemble a staff
and develop contingency plans. In December, the rescue force selection had been
completed and training exercises started. At the very beginning, the plan was to
develop separate components of the rescue force in different locations rather than
bring them together. Two of these components trained at their home bases to
maintain-some level of secrecy about the operation. In March 1980, the last training
exercise was conducted, and one month later the JCS reviewed the final plan to
rescue the hostages. The JCS approved the plan and recommended it to the
President, who approved it that same day. One week later, having successfully
deployed the forces to their staging areas (undetected), the assault force
rendezvoused at a small air strip in Iran's Great Salt Lake Desert. (Gabriel, 1988,
pg. 87)
3. The Mission
The rescue plan called for six C-130 transport aircraft staging from
Masirah to lift the men, equipment and helicopter fuel and fly to a secret landing
strip in Iran designated "Desert One." (Ryan, 1985, pg. 2) Three of the C-130s
would carry the 118-man assault team and a smaller force, a road-watch team to
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provide security at the desert landing spot. The other aircraft contained the extra
fuel needed for the RH-53D helicopters -- which had been launched from the
Carrier U.S.S. Nimitz (located in the Arabian Sea) three hours earlier. This was the
second element of the plan. The eight helicopters were to rendezvous at Desert
One with the C-130s, refuel, transfer men and equipment, and then continue with
the next phase of the operation. Those helicopters were to fly beneath the radar
coverage of Iran using only night vision devices and dead reckoning. Desert One
was located near a small village in the middle of a desert about 500 miles inland
from the Persian Gulf. The flight time until rendezvous for the helicopters was
approximately five and a half hours.
Once the rescue force transferred from the transports to.the helicopters,
the plan called for the helicopters to proceed to a site called "Desert Two." This
mountain hideout was approximately 50 miles from Teheran. Still in darkness then,
the assault force would spend the night and all the next day resting and making final
preparations. The helicopters were to be flown to another hideaway about 30 miles
outside Teheran and wait until they were called to recover the raiders and hostages
in Teheran. Evening the next day, the commandos would be secretly driven into
Teheran in trucks and vans by a four man group of Army special forces agents who
had been in-place ten days in advance of the raid to support the rescue. There was
also another platoon size force of Army Rangers who were near the Desert Two site.
They were responsible for preparing the way for a larger Ranger force of company
strength to -attack and seize asmall airstrip from which-the-hostages and rescue team
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from the helicopters was to be airlifted out by two C-141 aircraft. (Gabriel, 1988,
pp. 89-90)
Once inside the city of Teheran, the assault force would divide into three
separate teams. One of these teams would be responsible for rescuing the U.S.
charge d'affaires and two other diplomats held hostage in the foreign ministry
building. The remainder of the force, split into two groups, would be responsible
for storming the embassy, immobilizing the guards, and rescuing the hostages.
Intelligence sources had been able to size up the guard force, and this part of the
operation was considered the easiest to execute. As soon as the assault was under
way, the helicopters would leave their hiding place and proceed to separate landing
zones within the city. It was in the plan that six operational helicopters were needed
to execute the second element of the plan, although eight were deployed from the
carrier. Only five helicopters were actually needed in the city to recover the team.
(Gabriel, 1988, pg. 91)
If the rescue force was surrounded by an angry and hostile Iranian mob,
two circling AC-130 gunships would provide aircover. Meanwhile, the company-size
element of Rangers would be airlifted from Egypt and proceed to isolate the
Manzariyeh airstrip about 35 miles outside Teheran and await the arrival of the C-
141s. Naval air support and AC-130 gunships were also on call to provide air cover
should the helicopters come under attack. The helicopters, once clear of the city,
would proceed to the airstrip and waiting C-141s. Navy fighters and bombers would
cover the evacuation and suppress any Iranian ground or air reaction. The
55
helicopters would then be destroyed by their crews, and finally, the C-141s would
take off to return to Egypt. (Gabriel, 1988, pg. 92)
4. Command Relationships
Soon after the decision was made to rescue the hostages by military
action, General Edward Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, nominated Major General
James Vaught, USA, to lead the task force. He was confirmed on 12 November
1979. However, the JCS by then apparently had made a conscious decision not to
use the existing JTF structure (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 7). The JCS were
concerned with security of the mission. They believed the use of the JCS Crisis
Action System procedures would involve too many people to protect secrecy. This
fundamental decision forced Major General Vaught to create an entire ad hoc
organization (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 7).
In the course of the next several months, operational and training
requirements fluctuated as the rescue plan was developed and revised. The military
chain of command also evolved. Initially, Major General Vaught had no deputy.
He worked directly with Colonel Charlie Beckwith, USA, Commander of the Delta
Force assault team who would perform the main rescue action and with Colonel
James Kyle, USAF, who was in charge of the C-130 pilots and air crew training.
Later, Colonel Charles Pittman, USMC (special assistant on General Meyer's staff),
was ordered by Meyer to "become involved in the planning and execution of the
helicopter phase" of the operation (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 8). Although Pittman
was never formally assigned to the ad hoc "joint task force," by mid January 1980,
he had in effect established himself as the helicopter force leader. The situation was
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further confused when later, Lt. Colonel Seiffert, USMC, was designed by Major
General Vaught as the helicopter flight leader. Unfortunately, these command
relationships remained confused and unclarified during the majority of preparation
time for the rescue. During the actual operation, Pittman was indeed the deputy
commander for helicopter operations and reported directly to the task force
commander. Lt. Colonel Seiffert reported directly to Colonel Pittman. (Anno,
Einspahr, 1988, pg. 8)
Compounding this situation further was the introduction of Major General
Philip Gast, USAF, (by the JCS) to the chain of command, as a special consultant
to the task force. He had been to Teheran and it was thought that his experience
could assist in the planning phase. He was promoted to Lt. General on 1 April
1980, and subsequently was appointed Deputy Commander of the task force, even
though he outranked the commander. Apparently Major General Vaught never
formally spelled out the command structure to his task force from himself downward.
Several informal mid-level command relationships formed over time. Responsibility
for training and planning were also informal and conducted on a decentralized basis.
This structure hampered the training and planning necessary to attain the required
mission capability and proficiency. (Ryan, 1985, pg. 27)
Unfortunately, the command and control arrangements used to execute
the actual operation were also flawed. At no time during the nearly six months of
training and preparation nor during the operation itself was there a single mission
commander designated (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 9). There was Major General
Vaught, with overall control, but he was in Egypt nearly 1,000 miles away from the
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action; there was Major Bill Fitch, USA, the Desert One site security officer; there
was Lt. Colonel Seiffert, the helicopter flight leader; there was Colonel Kyle, the
C-130 and landing zone support commander; and there was Lt. Colonel Beckwith,
the ground forces commander. But there was no individual deployed with the force
who was responsible to integrate and coordinate the efforts of all these elements
(Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 9).
Operational control arrangements for the mission were confused as well.
Colonel Kyle was the landing zone commander, but Beckwith was the only individual
on site with go/no-go decision authority for the mission (Ryan, 1985, pg. 17).
Complicating Beckwith's authority was the extensive up-channel reporting and
monitoring network. This network included at least the U.S.S. Nimitz, an E-3
AWACS, the commander of the task force in Egypt, the Pentagon and the White
House.
President Carter firmly insisted that the lives of the hostages be protected,
and to do this he demanded that absolute secrecy be observed and the size of the
assault force be kept to an "absolute minimum." (Ryan, 1985, pg. 18) General
Vaught was responsible for maintaining security by ensuring that no single group was
knowledgeable of operational details of another group unless there was an absolute
need to know (Ryan, 1985, pg. 20). This procedure-is known as compartmentation.
The JCS issued specific orders on matters of task force organization and security,
and these served to constrain what Vaught was and was not authorized to shape in
his rescue plan.
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Attaining the "special mission" capability and qualifications required of the
marine pilots who were chosen for the helicopter phase had no precedent, and with
limited amount of information to draw from, training and perfecting techniques
were compressed into only four months time. This operation was considered high
risk, complex and the overall probability for success could only be guessed (Ryan,
1985, pg. 26). Both Gast and Pittman were often at odds on the conduct of the
helicopter training. Pittman was also in the position of having to report formally to
Vaught and informally to Gast (prior to his appointment as Deputy Commander).
Procedures and policy, as well as uncovering potential weaknesses in the training
emphasis, were responsibilities shared at three separate and distinct levels. Neither
Kyle nor Beckwith had to contend with the dual reporting requirements faced by
Pittman.
The criteria for six operational helicopters for the mission had been firmly
established in this chain of command. It had been determined early in the
operational planning stages that due to weight and lift capabilities, a minimum of six
helicopters would be required to carry out the actual rescue. As it turned out later,
this criteria came under "reconsideration" as far up the chain of command as the
White House. (Ryan, 1985, pg. 84)
5. Command, Control, and Communications
General Vaught chose not to use the fully staffed and integrated
intelligence component operating for the JCS. Instead, he nominated his own staff
intelligence officer and provided him with a small staff (Ryan, 1985, pg. 31). The
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also had the capability to provide an interagency
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Intelligence Task Force (ITF) but was not tasked by the JCS. The ITF, through the
director of the DIA, is directly subordinate to the JCS and can, on short notice,
assemble and organize selected units of the U.S.'s entire intelligence community
(Ryan, 1985, pg. 31). Vaught's J-2 could have had unlimited access to the ITF
sources with the burden of responsibility on intelligence resting with the DIA
director who would have headed the ITF. As it was, Vaught allowed intelligence
matters to demand more of his personal attention than with training (Ryan, 1985,
pg. 32). Vaught's J-2 did establish liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), DIA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, but these liaisons were at a much lower and informal
level than what could have been centralized at the three-star level by the director
of the DIA.
Compartmentation imposed by security also constrained the intelligence
staff of Vaught's organization. Weather officers, who were aware of the possibility
of severe dust storms in the Iranian desert, were not permitted to communicate this
information to the helicopter pilots (Ryan, 1985, pg. 33). Most intelligence support
personnel outside the intelligence staff never received a complete brief on the
mission, and the intelligence system became unresponsive due to administrative red
tape (Ryan, 1985, pg. 33).
Vertical communication elements were established early-on in the
planning stages. The training site for the rescue team was equiped with secure
telephone and message communications. Satellite communications (SATCOM)
systems linked the geographically separated chain-of-command to the operational
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units. General Vaught was to direct this complex rescue mission form his command
center located in Egypt. SATCOM would interconnect him with his operational
commanders, the Nimitz battle group in the Indian Ocean, and the NCA/Pentagon
(Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 13). Supplementing the SATCOM link throughout the
raid was an E-3 AWACS aircraft which could function as a C3 relay platform.
Internal and lateral communications among deployed field elements were
limited. Equipment incompatibilities existed among Air Force, Army and Marine
units, and procedural constraints imposed by operational security (OPSEC) measures
were strict. Army Rangers who were to provide the perimeter security for Desert
One site had radios which could not communicate with the C-130 or RH-53D pilots.
When Itanian nationals showed up in a bus on a road overlooking Desert One, this
information along with the status of the Ranger Force could not be relayed directly
to Kyle or Beckwith. They used a messenger to run informatior back and forth
(Anno, Eisnpahr, 1988, pg. 13). Compounding matters more was that the Desert
One site could not communicate directly with the helicopter force. Furthermore, the
helicopter pilots were under strict orders to maintain radio silence throughout tlveir
flight (Anno, Einspahr, ,9 88, nr. 14).
6. Mission Abort and Tragedy
The first C-130 to arrive at Desert One contained Colonel Beckwith,
Colonel Kyle, and some members of the assault force. This team was responsible
for controlling air traffic, securing the site's perimeter and establishing a road
watch. Almost immediately after posting guards on the road, an Iranian bus with
passengers was stopped and held by Rangers. Beckwith radioed Vaught with this
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news. The White House was apprised by the Pentagon and agreed to hold the
witnesses until after the operation was over. Within-the next few hours, the first two
C-130s had discharged all members of the assault force and departed, leaving four
C-130s (three loaded-with fuel) at Desert One.
For the helicopter force, things were going wrong in a hurry. Two hours
into the mission form the aircraft carrier, the pilot of helicopter #6 had to land his
aircraft due to indications of mechanical failure of the main rotor spar. Helicopter
#8 observed #6 land, and as wingman, he too landed to provide support. The
decision was made to abandon #6 and proceed in #8. The crew of #6 removed all
classified material but did not destroy the aircraft for fear of alerting the Iranians
(Ryan, 1985, pg. 69).
One hour later, all seven helicopters flew into an unexpected dust storm.
For khe next couple of hours, the helicopters flew by instruments and became
separated. Helicopter #1 landed and the pilot, Lt. Colonel Seiffert, radioed by
special radio channel to General Vaught to inform himnof the situation. Helicopter
#2, his wingman, also landed. Vaught and Seiffert agreed- that despite the storin,
the helicopters could proceed. No one was yet aware that helicopter #6 was down.
(Ryan, 1985, pg. 70)
As the helicopters battled, their way through the storm, helicopter #5
suffered a casualty to its navigation and flight control system. Colonel Pittman was
onboard this helicopter. Poor visibility, disorientation, and the loss of instruments
forced the pilot to abort and.return tothe carrier. Because of radio silencej none
of the helicopters knew of the loss of two of the force. Furthermore, because there
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were no communications with Desert One, no one was aware that the dust storm
was not affecting the site--in fact, it was a clear night there (Ryan, 1985, pg. 80).
Had the pilot of #5 known this, he would have proceeded to Desert One. To make
matters worse, #5 contained all of the helicopter spare parts and maintenance
equipment. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 114)
Nearly ninety minutes behind schedule, six of the original eight helicopters
finally arrived at Desert One. Helicopter #2 reported that its hydraulic system was
out of commission. The mission was now down to only five helicopters. Without
any spare parts, the repair effort was impossible, and mission abort became
inevitable. Both Beckvth and Kyle conferred and agreed to abort. Kyle radioed
Vaught, who in turn radioed the Pentagon. The White House agreed with
Beckwith's recommendation because "he was the only man qualified to make the
decision." (Ryan, 1985, pg. 85) Vaught and White House representatives both
briefly considered recommending to President Carter that the mission proceed with
only five helicopters. In fact, Vaught asked Beckwith to reconsider, but Beckwith
reminded him of anticipated additional mechanical problems and probable
helicopter losses in Teheran (Ryan, 1985, pg. 84).
While this information exchange was taking place, the helicopters
proceeded with the refueling operation. It was while helicopter #3 was repositioning
that it crashed into a C-130. The C-130 exploded, killing five Air Force men. Three
Marines died in helicopter #3. Several men suffered serious burns while escaping
the burning C-130. As the fires raged, Kyle gave the orde, evacuate as quickly
as possible and .not take the time to destroy the helicopters. The three remaining
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C-130 crews jettisoned jeeps and motorcycles to make seating room for the men, and
thirty minutes after the crash, they were airborne. The flight out of Iran proceeded
without further incident. (Ryan, 1985, pg. 91)
Colonel Kyle was not aware that the helicopters contained classified-
documents and countermanded one of the pilot's orders to his crew to destroy the
helicopter. The helicopter pilots naturally questioned the orders to abandon their
aircraft because they didn't recognize who was in charge on the ground. Beckwith
personally went from one C-130 to the next shouting at the pilots not to take off on
their own initiative until the assault force was loaded. Confusion among the dust,
fire, and noise was only compounded by multiple commanders yelling orders.
Whether or not the overall mission could have succeeded given six helicopters will
remain a mystery. Some members of the investigation team gave it only a 60 to 70
percent chance of success. Others who had been involved: in the planning of the
mission gave it much less. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pp. 10-15)
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B. QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDENTS
1. Explain the principle of the unity of command and describe why a well-
integrated and well-understood chain-of-command is essential to mission
success and efficiency.
2. What elements of command and control were missing in the ad hoc Joint
Task Force structure that was organized for this mission? What was the weak
link in the chain of command.
3. How could the JCS CAS have been used to enhance training and readiness?
What is the importance of an independent review group in evaluating an
operational plan?
4. At what level or echelon should OPCON be vested?
5. What role does intelligence collection play in mission planning? At what
level should a J-2 staff element be responsible for collection, analysis, and
collation of data?
6. What is the balance between the need to maintain OPSEC and effective
communications? How does compartmentation of information aid or hinder
the planners of an operation?
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VII. CASE STUDY NUMBER TWO
A. THE GRENADA INVASION - OPERATION URGENT FURY
1. Introduction
On 25 October 1983, forces of the U.S. military invaded the country of
Grenada. This decision was made on the basis of several factors. The first was that
on 19 October, the government of Grenada collapsed, and members of a radical
group of leftist rivals executed the country's prime minister. A second factor was
the fear of another hostage crisis. There were thought to be over 800 American
students at Grenada's medical school, and the president and his advisors feared that
the new revolutionary regime would hold them hostage. One additional factor was
that the Reagan administration also feared that Grenada would move into a Soviet
bloc arena, specifically with Cuba. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 36)
To invade Grenada, the military operation called for the island to be
assaulted by two separate forces. The Marines were tasked with the northern half
of the island and Army Rangers the southern half. Approximately 1500 troops were
committed to the southern half, focusing on an airstrip at Point Salines. To the
north, 400 Marines would take over the airport-located at Pearls. Prior to the action
at these locations, Navy SEALS would be inserted near St. Georges to secure the
safety of Grenada's governor and to capture the government's radio station. (Anno,
Einspahr, 1988, pg. 37)
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In total, the invading force was to number about 1900 men with an
anticipated number close to 5000 over the next few days. Assistance from
neighboring islands called for 300 additional troops. The resistance expected from
Grenada ranged from as few as 2000 up to 7200 fighters. In three days, the main
objectives were achieved, and 599 Americans and 80 foreign nationals were rescued
from Grenada. Eventually, U.S. forces were able to re-establish a representative
form of government on the island of Grenada. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 37)
The decision to invade Grenada began only about one week prior to the
actual invasion. Military plans were finalized only 72 hours before the action began.
Naval forces were either put to sea or re-directed to positions off the coast of the
island of Grenada. Army Rangers and other forces assembled at both Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, and Fort Stewart, Georgia. The president placed full operational
control of the mission in the hands of the JCS. The JCS had a free hand in both
planning and execution. The entire operation was meant to be a military show
without any political interference from the White House. President Reagan did not
want another Iranian desert disaster. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 151)
2. Background
The Reagan administration came into power believing that the U.S. had
lost its credibility. This was based on a number of factors. First, the Reagan
administration believed that the world no longer thought the U.S. would or could
respond to a military challenge. This may have been based on the U.S.'s dismal
failure in Iran or the lack of U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
This perception lead to a belief that the Soviets might further create challenges to
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the U.S. The need to re-establish U.S. credibility is postulated to have been a major
factor in the decision to invade Grenada. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 150)
Second, was the Reagan administration's concern over a 12,000 foot
runway being built by Cuban workers with British technology. The White House was
certain that the new revolutionary regime would make the runway accessible to both
Cuban and Soviet military aircraft. Finally, the Reagan administration viewed what
was happening in El Salvador as a Soviet provocation, and the opportunity for the
U.S. to "stand-tall" was going to be in Grenada. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 151)
Overall responsibility for the success of the invasion rested with the
Chairman, JCS, General John Vessey. The president's action seemed-rooted in his
belief that the Iran raid would have succeeded had it been left solely to the military.
By placing the invasion of Grenada in the JCS's arena, President Reagan did two
things. First, he clearly affirmed his trust and cOnfidence in the military's ability to
get the job done. Secondly, if things went horribly wrong -- as they did in Iran--
then the JCS could be held fully to blame and the Reagan administration-would be
politically "off-the-hook." (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 151) If things worked well, then the
president could obviously reap the benefits.
3. The Mission
The invasion plan called for a number of special forces actions prior to
the actual invasion of Grenada by the main force. The main force was made up of
Marines, Rangers, and members of the 82nd Airborne Division. Supporting the
invasion, but not under U.S. OPCON, were elements of Barbados and Jamaican
police-and what was known collectively as the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. The
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JTF organization was supported by Navy and Air Force elements as well. The
U.S.S. Independence Battle Group, elements of the Military Airlift Command
(MAC), Tactical Air Command (TAG), Strategic Air Command (SAC), and the
Readiness Command (READCOM) also supported the JTF. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988,
pg. 39)
The mission's principal objective was to overwhelm the island's defense
force in a quick, massive, "surgical" action designed to minimize loss of life (Gabriel,
1985, pg. 151). The main military objectives were to: rescue the students at the
medical school, evacuate the governor and other foreign nationals, and stabilize the
internal situation by capturing the new Grenadian leadership (Metcalf, 1986, pg.
281). In effect, the plan was to take over the island-and install a new regime more
compatible with the U.S.'s interests (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 151).
There were a total of seven special operations missions to be conducted
prior to the main invasion. Two of these were assigned to the counter-
terrorist/hostage-rescue Delta Force. The night before the invasion, this force was
to parachute into Point Salines and secure the airstrip. At dawn, C-130 aircraft
would land at this airport and unload the Ranger assault force. Additionally, the
Delta Force was assigned the task of assaulting Richmond Prison and rescuing
political prisoners held there. These prisoners were considered vulnerable to being
held hostage. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 152)
The Navy's SEAL team comprised of 22 men was responsible for rescuing
and evacuating the governor from his estate. The SEAL team would be inserted by
helicopter and evacuate thv- governor to the U.S.S. Guam. Additional SEAL teams
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were to reconnoiter the Marine landing zone at Pearls airport, seize the radio
transmitting station, and take control of the island's main diesel generating plant.
(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 152)
The main force was to deliver the major blow to Grenada's defenses.
These forces included Rangers deploying to the Point Salines airport as the initial
strike force and as the means to permit reinforcement by the 82nd Airborne division.
The other action was by Marines deployed by helicopter assault launched from
U.S.S. Guam. The Marines were to secure the airport at Pearls. The source of
greatest military force was to be provided by the 82nd Airborne division, which could
deploy 3000 men by C-141 aircraft to-Point Salines. Another brigade size force was
staged at Fort Bragg in ready reserve. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 153)
The invasion plan called for committing two Ranger battalions of about
800 men each. A strike force of about 600 men would be formed at Point Salines
airport. Meanwhile, the Marines would put ashore a battalion- landing team -- about
800 men including five to seven tanks. With the 150 or so men in the special forces
teams and the main force, the "plan" was to put 5,000 men in Grenada. With
reinforcements, the invasion force grew to 8,000 (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 154). All tolled,
the U.S. and assisting neighbors only encountered approximately 1,200 Grenadians,
780 Cubans, 49 Soviets, 24 North Koreans, 16 East Germans, 14 Bulgarians, and 4
Libyans (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 37).
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4. Command Relationships
To carry out the invasion of Grenada, JTF 120 was established.
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), Admiral Wesley
McDonald, with guidance from the JCS, was responsible for expanding the plan.
Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, USN, was placed in command of JTF 120 with
Major General Norman Schwartzkoph, USA, as his deputy. The Grenada invasion
was to be a joint operation with forces from all four services.
The JTF was augmented by a staff selected from Metcalf's command
organization as Commander, Second Fleet. Added to the fifteen officers from the
Second Fleet Staff were augmentees from the Air Force, Army, CIA, and the State
Department. Liaison officers from the Rangers and 82nd Airborne also were
provided. Under normal conditions, the JTF 120 staff would have had as many as
88 people assigned, but with the short fuzed nature of the operation, Metcalf
improvised.
Directly reporting to Metcalf as CJTF 120 were four component task
forces -- USAF, USA Ranger, USA 82nd Airborne, and USN Amphibious Readiness
Group (ARG). In direct support of JTF 120 was the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force
and the Navy's U.S.S. Independence Battle Group (Metcalf, 1986, pg. 281). The
Marine Landing Force was directly subordinate to the ARG Task Force
Commander. Command and control of all special operations missions was vested
in the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The JSOC was created following
the Iranian rescue mission to provide integration-of mixed special force units. This
command is a special planning group outside normal command channels. It has
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total authority over controlling the resources assigned to it. In Grenada, JSOC was
responsible for all special operations missions, including Delta Force, SEAL teams,
and all the rescue and seize objectives. The initial Ranger deployment and the
aircraft used were controlled by JSOC. The C2 staff of JSOC used a C-130 airborne
command post over Grenada during the operation. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 153)
Major General Schwarzkopf was initially assigned to Metcalf's staff as a
liaison officer, but early in the planning process and on his own authority, Metcalf
appointed him deputy. Each day before and during the invasion, Metcalf and his
component commanders met and discussed the mission as it was developing. In
addition to the mission statement issued from higher authority, JTF 120 was given
the following ROE (Metcalf, 1986, pg. 281):
* Use force and weapons as may be essential to the accomplishment of the
mission.
9 Minimize the disruptive influence of military operations on the local economy.
* Execute initial tasks with minimum damage and casualties.
Vice Admiral Metcalf's flagship as Commander, Second Fleet, was the
U.S.S. Mount Whitney, the newest command and control platform in the Navy's
inventory. The communications suite was considered the most capable and state-
of-the-art. However, when Metcalf deployed to Grenada, he was stationed aboard
U.S.S. Guam, one of the Navy's oldest amphibious ships. The communications suite
aboard this ship was limited and had not been upgraded commensurate with the
cormmunication requirements-necessary to support a JTF commander (Metcalf, 1986,
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pg. 293) Furthermore, this class of ship had never been designed as a flagship of
this level.
The JCS planned from the beginning to assign forces according to mission.
Forces were assigned tasks that closely paralleled service training. The JCS
assignment of tasks to the Army and Marines was intended to utilize their
specialized, individual training. The JCS made a deliberate planning decision to
keep the units separate. This was meant to keep the Marines and Army from
"shooting at one another." (Metcalf, 1986, pg. 283)
S. Command, Control and Communications
In executing the mission, the C2 structure was simplistic, designed to
employ forces in a way consistent with their specialties and training. To allow forces
to fight the way they were trained, two ground commanders were used, one for the
Marines in the north, and another for the Army forces in the south. The principle
of unity of command notwithstanding, this was rationalized as necessary to ensure
that differences in operating styles would not jeopardize the mission.
To improve unity of effort, each subordinate commander met with Vice
Admiral Metcalf on a daily basis -- either aboard the flagship, or when he came
ashore. These meetings produced a hard copy report which was sent to
USCINCLANT and to JCS outlining the next day's military plan. A significant
portion of Metcalf's staff, as part of his battle organization, was committed to
communicating up the chain of command to the NCA. This group, under the
direction of a navy captain, was charged, y Metcalf with submitting two situation
reports each hour. The staff operations officer, another navy captain with alot of
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experience with the USCINCLANT staff, maintained a secure link with
USCINCLANT during the combat operations.
Admiral Metcalf's rational for this was that he believed the CINC and his
staff should always hear the same voice over the circuit, a voice they knew and could
relate to. The object was to create the impression that Metcalf was in control and
knew what was happening. The system of situation reports and the "command voice"
were the primary reasons, he felt, that higher authority permitted him to retain
control over the military action at the local (Grenada) level. In a lessons learned
article, Metcalf wrote:
In this day of instant communications from and to anywhere in the world,
combined with the high status involved, the local command has an obligation
to communicate information up if he expects to retain control. Higher
command authority must always have information, or they will remove control
from the local commander. (Metcalf, 1986, pg. 285)
Intelligence support was provided by various sources throughout all phases
of the operation. According to initial JCS estimates on the resistance expected on
Grenada, the U.S. could look to find between 700 and 1100 Cuban soldiers
augmented by another 1500 from the People's Revolutionary Army (Grenadian
Army) and 2000 to 5000 Grenadian territorial militia (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 154).
Against this number, the JCS plan called for only 5000 U.S. troops in the initial
assault. Counting two reinforcing brigades of the 82nd Airborne, total U.S. forces
would only number about 8000 men. Army doctrine states that forces attacking a
deployed defense typically require a-three-to-one advantage to ensure success. The
JCS did not take these estimates seriously, nor did they expect the Grenadian and
Cuban forces to fight well. Additionally, these forces were essentially unarmed, and
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the weapons they did have were relatively unsophisticated. Or so the JCS convinced
themselves and the president. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 155)
Intelligence sources were not able to pinpoint the exact location of all of
the American students, and U.S. forces had not received information that there were
two other groups of students on the island. Army forces carried tourist maps into
the battle with improvised grid co-ordination systems. No terrain contours were
drawn on these maps, and many were hand drawn and reproduced the night before
the invasion. The Marines were equipped with old British maps. Both sets of maps
had different grid systems for locating points on the ground. One consequence of
the lack of maps was the inadvertent destruction of a-mental hospital located near
an enemy defensive position at Fort Frederic. The hospital was not shown on maps
used by-the Nav' air strike force. In another case, an air strike called in by the
Marines hit an Army command post because the grid co-ordinates did not match.
(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 178)
Communications support, as with the military organization for the
operation, was a "come-as-you-are" proposition. Unlike the combat forces who were
organized to fight independently of one another, communications was to have been
the link that tied together the operation of the four U.S. military services.
Heavy use a:,d rdiance was placed on satellite communications
(SATCOM). The operation had several satellite channels assigned to it. In many
cases, satellite communications were available at a company level from man-pack
radio terminals. High frequency and other tactical radio units were used in the
invasion and used as back-Lp tu. the satellite paths. Aboard the flagship, U.S.S.
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Guam, Vice Admiral Metcalf faced communication equipment shortages and
limitations in that he could only access one secure voice channel -- which became
the task force common circuit. (Metcalf, 1986, pg. 295)
Similar communication shoitages existed in the distribution of intelligence
related information. National assets ano human intelligence networks were not
directed toward collection efforts in Grenada because it was considered only a third
world country. Furthermore, when adequate maps had been procured from the
Defense Mapping Agency, they were mailed rather than transmitted via intelligence
electronic means. Satellite imagery of defense strongholds was not provided to the
field commanders on the ground, but remained in Washington, D.C., or in Norfolk,
VA. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pp. 42-43)
Shortages were not the only communications problem found in Grenada;
interoperability was another. For example, uncoordinated use of radio frequencies
prevented radio communications between Marines in the-north and Rangers -in the
south. As such, interservice communications was prevented, except through off shore
relay stations, and, this kept Marine commanders unaware for too long that Rangers
were pinned down without adequate armor (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 43).
Commenting overall on the issue of interoperability, Admiral Metcalf wrote:
In Grenada, we did not have interoperability with the Army and the Air Force,
even though we had been assured at the outset we did. So consequently, we
could not make the installed communications work. (Metcalf, 1986, pg. 295)
Several factors have been cited as the cause of the communications problems
confronted in- Grenada. Among them were insufficient planning for the operation,
lack of training, inadequate procedures, maldeployment of communications security
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(COMSEC) keying material for the different radio networks and a lack of
preparation through exercise realism. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 44)
While the details of most of the above noted causes are not available in
unclassified sources, the issue of exercise realism has been clearly and perceptively
explained by Admiral Metcalf following the invasion:
We do conduct communications exercises in the Navy, but in these exercises,
we give our communicators about 12 months preparation. Therefore, it should
not be surprising that when the exercise starts, communications work... The
communicators may not be so much at fault. Our failure in preparatory
exercises to uncover and anticipate problems similar to those we faced in
Grenada may have been because our exercises are over prepared. Given
enough time, anyone can make communications work. And if the objective of
an exercise is to make things work, then the conduct of the exercise will be
optimized to show that the exercise will work. Unfortunately, in a crisis
situation -- a "come-as-you-are" situation -- it did not work. (Metcalf, 1986, pg.
295)
6. Operation Urgent Fury - A Political Success; A Military Lesson
The element of surprise was considered essential to the entire invasion.
The success of the invasion depended heavily on the ability to quickly seize and hold
the airport at Point Salines until reinforcements arrived (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 177).
Days before the invasion, the Cubans undertook significant actions to improve basic
defenses on the island, particularly at the Point Salines airport. Cuban forces
constructed bunkers all around the airfield and dug in. Approximately 35 to 40
soldiers of the Delta team were parachuted into Point Salines in darkness, and when
the Cuban garrison spotted them, the element of surprise was gone (Gabriel, 1985,
pg. 156). Delta Force personnel were surrounded on three sides by Cuban forces
and quickly began to fight for their lives. Twenty-two men were killed before the
Rangers landed and rescued them at dawn (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 157). Defenders were
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now fully alerted to the invasion, and the, alarm was sounded throughout the island
four hours before the main forces arrived (Gabriel, 1985, pg. .157).
The second Delta team, launched at dawn of the first day, was to assault
Richmond Hill Prison and rescue the political prisoners held there. Richmond
Prison is located atop a steep, sixty-degree promontory behind the town of St.
Georges. The prison located on this elevated mountain poiat offers no place for a
helicopter assault force to land. Three of the four sides cannot be approached by
foot except through dense jungle. The fourth side is, accessible through a narrow
roadway bordered by tall trees. Across the valley and higher up is Fort Frederic.
It was from here that a large Grenadian garrison was housed and defense forces
were directed. The helicopter assault force was met with heavy armed resistance,
and many helicopters crashed on the valley floor as a result. The Delta team's
assault on Richmond Prison failed.
SEAL teams to the north were facing challenges of their own. Two four-
man teams were dropped by C-130 aircraft in the sea near the end of Pearls runway.
They were to reconnoiter the airport to determine what fortifications there might be.
The marines intended to conduct a heliborne assault against the airport and -had to
know the nature and strength of its defenses. Although the method of bringing them
in remains classified, it seems that the SEAL teams were to lw-altitude parachute
from the C-130s into the water. This technique uses a drogue parachute to pull the
men and equipment from the back of a low flying C-130 aircraft as it skims the
water. What happened is that one four-man team deploying from the aircraft in
its rubber whale boat was knocked unconscious by the impact with the water.
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Thrown from the boat as it hit the water, and weighed down with weapons and
equipment, the men were dragged under and drowned. The second team landed in
the water safely, but somehow lost its engine, and the current dragged the men out
to sea. The Marines therefore had no advance team in place to secure the area
prior to their landing. A third SEAL team met heavily reinforced defenses at the
radio transmitter tower and was forced to retreat, failing at its mission. A fourth
SEAL team inserted at the governor's mansion quickly found itself surrounded and
trapped with the governor. It must be emphasized here that JSOC had overall
operational responsibility for the execution of these special missions outside the JTF
120 organization.
The initial Ranger deployment to Point Salines airport was rigged for the
aircraft to land, but because the-airport was not secured against enemy fire, the plan
was changed to a parachute assault. As a result, much of the heavy medical
supplies, communication equipment, and anti-tank weaponry could not be airdropped
(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 164). The assault did not go well at all. Command elements of
Rangers found themselves separated from their battalions as the C-130s staggered
in under enemy fire. Aircraft were only committing to the drop zone one at a time,
and this lead to confusion and delay. This piecemeal deployment was attributed to
airborne forces having to re-rig enroute. Gradually, Cuban forces withdrew as -the
Rangers took up offensive positions, but reinforcements did not arrive as originally
planned until almost five hours after the first assault. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 166)
Meanwhile, the Marines put ashore without resistance and were in the
process of unloading reinforcement tanks-and vehicles when the command came to
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redeploy across the island to support Army elements. Between helicopter transport
and amphibious means, the Marines responded with flexibility and speed, but tanks
found themselves in exposed positions, near the governor's mansion without infantry
support. Over the course of the day, Marines were also in a position to aid in the
attack on Richmond Hill Prison (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 167). By listening to Cuban
radio broadcasts, it was apparent that the resistance was being controlled and
directed from Ft. Frederic, which was the nerve center for Cuban and Grenadian
forces. Assisted by naval aviation units from the carrier battle group, Ft. Frederic
was eventually destroyed, and the overall resistance effoit seemed to lose momentum
(Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 37).
The Rangers-reached students located at one campus on the first day of
the invasion but had no idea that there were students located elsewhere on the
island. One group was located at a campus only-four miles from the airport, and
another group was located in a housing complex -further to the north. Although it
took another two days to rescue these students, no threats were made against them
by Cubans or Grenadians. It was not until U.S. forces arrived-that the-students felt
any real danger because it was then that a battle between- U.S. forces and the
Grenadians could have forced the enemy through its defensive lines through the
campus itself. A combined assault force was used to isolate the main body of the
defenders, and they eventually either ran away or surrendered.
It was on the third day of the invasion-that U.S. forces had finally gained
the advantage. The remaining enemy strongholds were attacked by Rangers and
paratroopers from the 82nd. Navy A-7 attack aircraft provided necessary air cover.
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Back at Point Salines, forces from the 82nd had only moved about four miles north.
It was then that the Army units came into contact with Marine forces, and a
friendly-on-friendly engagement nearly resulted (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 173). By the end
of the third day, Operation Urgent Fury had achieved all military objectives, safely
evacuated the students and other "political prisoners," and came to an end (Gabriel,
1985, pg. 173).
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B. QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDENTS
1. Explain the principle of unity of command and how different operating
procedures can cause disunity between different services.
2. Explain how Vice Admiral Metcalf applied the concept of "span of control"
in dealing with the chain of command. What role did delegation of authority
play in his command structure?
3. What role does intelligence distribution play in a military operation? Do
tactical commanders need the capability to analyze and correlate information
in near real-time? If so, why?
4. How can communicators improve interoperability and integration of forces
in a situation where "come as you are" is faced? Describe types of exercises
that can be used to enhance realism in a peacetime environment.
5. Were the rules of engagement clear and unambiguous enough to perform the
mission? How does ROE form the direction for the accomplishment of a
mission?
6. How did use of the JTF apparatus aid in planning a mission on short notice.
Is the JTF command structure sufficient in handling a crisis of the-magnitude
experienced in Grenada?
7. How does duplicity of effort such as special operations under a separate
command structure help or hinder an operation?
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VIII. CASE STUDY NUMBER THREE
A. THE RAID ON LIBYA - OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON
1. Introduction
On the evening of 15 April 1986, the U.S. launched a series of-military air
strikes against ground targets inside Libya. This action was justified by President
Reagan to the public as a matter of U.S. self defense against Libya's state-sponsored
terrorism. In part, he stated that "self defense is ,-ot only our right, it is our duty."
(Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 49)
Initial planning for operations against Libya began immediately following
terrorist attacks against Rome and Vienna airports in late December 1985. The use
of force was specifically provoked by Libya's directed terrorist bombing of a West
Berlin discotheque 7 April 1986, in which one American was killed and 200 innocent
people were injured (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 49). The air strike against Libya was
designed specifically to hit Libya's known terrorist activity centers. Initially, five
targets were selected because of their direct connection to terrorist elements within
Libya. These targets ranged from military airfields where Libya was expected to
launch air defense to terrorist command posts and training sites. The final targets
were chosen at a National Security Council level-by a close-circle of advisors to the
president (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 49).
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In response to national tasking, U.S. naval forces operated in the vicinity
of Libya between January and April 1986. The operations were divided into two
distinct phases. Phase One was conducted between the months of January and
March and involved freedom of navigation operations conducted ostensibly to
challenge illegal Libyan claims to s6vereignty over water and airspace in the Gulf
of Sidra (CNO, 1987, pg. 37). Phase Two, conducted in April, was designed with the
main objective of inflicting damage to terrorist facilities and military installations
that supported Libyan subversive activities. During this phase, coordinated USN and
USAF air strikes were conducted against the targets selected by the NSC.
2. Background
During the middle years of the Reagan administration, international
terrorism was making front page headlines almost daily. Public interest in Libya's
state-sponsored terrorist activities reached a peak when the airports in Rome and
Vienna were bombed, causing numerous casualties and injuries. International
terrorist attacks were dramatically increasing, and- the time for the U.S. to provide
incentives and reasons for altering this criminal behavior had finally come.
Terrorist organizations in Libya were gaining momentum. They were
gathering new weapons and explosives, establishing sophisticated- training programs,
stepping up recruitment, and regrouping for new-rounds of premeditated violence.
Terrorism was evolving so quickly that the U.S. was facing some unique challenges.
Groups of terrorists were increasing their co-ordination and range-of tactics, as well
as openly committing to eliminate U.S. influence-in the Middle East.
84
For the most part, U.S. public opinion backed any action that was meant
to strike at the heart of Libya's ability to export terrorism. When the West Berlin
discotheque was bombed by Libyan sponsored terrorists, the cry for self-defense was
heard through the West. President Reagan invoked Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter to explain the purpose of the mission to strike Libya. The timing of the
attack was such that while some of the strike aircraft were still in the air, the
President was able to address the U.S. public and much of the world.
In the month previous to the raid against Libya, during the freedom of
navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra, U.S. naval forces were attacked by Libyan
military forces. In an area just south of Khadafi's "line-of-death," Libyan surface to
air missiles (SAM) were launched against U.S. aircraft operating in traditionally
international airspace. Naval forces responded by attacking the SAM sites-at Sirte
and Libyan patrol boats threatening U.S. naval forces. (CNO, 1987, pg. 44)
3. The Mission
Five targets which were initially selected included: the Aziziyah barracks
described as C2 headquarters for Libyan terrorists; Tripoli's military facility and
main airport; the Sidi Bilal base which was a terrorist training camp; the Jamahiriyah
military barracks in Benghazi-which was a terrorist command post; and Benina air
base. All except one of these targets were chosen because of their direct connection
to terrorist activity. The exception was Benina airfield which was a military
installation from which Libyan fighter aircraft were staged. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988,
pg. 50)
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All five targets were planned to be hit by U.S. forces simultaneously.
Navy resources were not in a position to accomplish the mission by themselves.
Since a precision night attack was planned, there were only two types of aircraft that
could perform the strike mission: Navy A-6 and Air Force F-111 aircraft.
Although there were two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean at the time
initial planning for the raid began, they were not equipped with sufficient A-6
aircraft required (32 total) to successfully hit all targets simultaneously. The-nearest
F-111 aircraft were based in the United Kingdom (UK), and their use was going to
significantly affect the scope and complexity of the mission. French authorities
refused airspace authorization for the F-111s to fly over France which added both
distance and time to the flight to Tripoli. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 51)
The size of the strike force was immense. Approximately 100 aircraft
were going to be committed to the strike mission. The Air Force was to provide 28
tankers, five electronic counter measur. (ECM) configured F-111 Raven aircraft, and
24 F-111 strike aircraft. The Navy was to provide four E-2C Hawkeye airborne C2
and warning aircraft, 18 F-14 Tomcat Fighters for combat air patrol, 12 A-7E and
F/A-18 electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, and 14 A-6E strike aircraft. (Anno,
Einspahr, 1988, pg. 51)
In addition to-the strike and direct support aircraft, helicopters and several
other types of aircraft were airborne in the vicinity of the carrier battle groups
positioned 200 miles offshore to provide search and rescue and other miscellaneous
operations. The two carrier battle groups, U.S.S. America and U.S.S. Coral Sea,
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were comprised of the standard mix of cruisers (AEGIS), destroyers, frigates, and
two submarines in direct support.
Two days prior to the actual raid, the task force conducted a practice
strike and joint C3 exercise at sea with USAF units. Although joint in nature, the
actual execution of the strike was operationally and geographically split between the
Air Force and Navy. Navy A-6 strike aircraft were assigned the target in the
Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s were to hit the other three targets in the
vicinity of Tripoli (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 52). A preemptive strike was planned
against the Benina military airfield by a combination of USAF and USN attack
aircraft to prevent Libyan interceptors from taking off and attacking the incoming
U.S bombing raid (Anno, Einspahr, 19888, pg. C).
The first aircraft to launch were the USAF tankers followed closely by the
F/EF-111s. Because of the diplomatic actions of France, the flight to Tripoli was
an additional 1300 nautical miles (or six to seven flight hours.) Four refuelings were
required during their transit. The Air Force aircraft would be integrated into the
Navy's airborne force as directed by an Air Force officer aboard a KC-10 tanker
which had been modified to act as an airborne command coordination platform.
(Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 52)
Actual combat operations commenced at 0200 local time and lasted less
than twelve minutes. Planning, coordination, and control efforts which had started
months earlier resulted in over sixty tons of ordnance being dropped on targets in
Libya. Success of the mission depended heavily on the element of surprise. The
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raid on Libya involved (to some degree) more aircraft and combat ships than what
the British had deployed against the Falklands. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 52)
4. Command Relationships
Commander in Chief, Europe Command (USCINCEUR), through his
naval component commander CINCUSNAVEUR, designated Commander, Sixth
Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT), Vice Admiral Frank Kelso, as Commander, Central
Mediterranean Operations (COMCENTMEDOPS) with a direct link between the
two commands (CNO, 1987, pg. 7). In the mission planning, the chairman of the
JCS (CJCS), Admiral William Crowe, emphasized noninterference from higher
authority by making every effort to provide COMCENTMEDOPS, the on-scene
commander, with full authority to make any necessary decisions. (Anno, Einsphar,
1988, pg. 53)
Consistent with the CJCS philosophy, Vice Admiral Kelso, designated as
the Joint Commander, was given complete C2 of the operation. He was assigned
the mission and was provided a time line for the raid. As on-scene commander, he
was given complete authority and flexibility to deal with any varying contingency in
the strike environment (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 53). Vice Admiral Kelso also had
authority to abort the mission up to ten minutes prior to execution due to weather
or other operational considerations. Given the time line and the requisite authority,
COMCENTMEDOPS simply had to bring it all together.
The concept of noninterference with command and control seems to have
cascaded down the entire chain of command in varying degrees. A forma!-diagram
of the C2arrangements might seem complex -- reflecting operational control lines,
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tactical control responsibilities, vertical/lateral coordination channels, reporting
chains, etc. However, in actual practice, normal and existing operational and
administrative channels through EUCOM were used for the planning and execution
of this operation.
Each service essentially did its own weapons system planning for the
operational area. Nearly all detailed staff planning was delegated to unit level.
Initial warning orders for a possible strike against Libya were issued to various task
organizations in late December 1985. The nature of contingency tasking severely
limited higher headquarters tasking and assistance (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 54).
Headquarters staff officers who would not be flying the mission did not involve
themselves with making decisions rightfully made by those flying the mission (Anno,
Einspahr, 1988, pg. 54). In addition, there was an substantial flow of inquiries and
guidance directly to the task units.
Exchange of liaison officers and coordinated planning by USAF/USN
organizations facilitated in eliminating some of the interoperability problems (e.g.
Navy and Air Force vernacular, terminology and procedures) that plagued earlier
multi-service operations. The Air Force liaison officer was an experienced pilot and
became an integral part of the Navy's battle staff. The Navy's exchange officer was
a similarly qualified pilot who became part of the command structure aboard the
KC-10 command aircraft. (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 54)
The division of responsibility for geographical areas of the Libya raid was
done to simplify the C2 of the operational aspects of the strike. The modified KC-
10 tanker controlled USAF assets and the carrier, U.S.S. America, controlled USN
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assets. Airborne E-2C Hawkeye aircraft provided early warning, air control
vectoring and combat air patrol operations.
The need for an elaborate, up-channel, status reporting to EUCOM was
eliminated due to the anticipated short duration of the raid. Timely reporting of
preliminary results in support of President Reagan's simultaneous nationaltelevision
announcement was considered absolutely essential. The up-channel reporting was
handled informally and verbally using existing established satellite communication
systems (SATCOM). (Anno, Einspahr, 1988, pg. 56)
Operational control and tactical control of El Dorado Canyon were
conducted from the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC) aboard U.S.S. America.
The Battle Group Commander and COMCENTMEDOPS were co-located aboard
the carrier. All in all, the success of the mission was considered to be the result of
establishing and maintaining a simple correnand structure. A flexible and effectively
integrated battle force command organization was credited in part for eliminating
or reducing interoperability lessons that were learned in Grenada. (Anno. Einspahr,
1988, pg. 65)
5. Command, Control and Communications
National signals intelligence (SIGINT) and satellite photo imagery assets
provided direct support to mission planners. The Defense Intelligence Agency and
NSA were formally tasked with providing intelligence support for strike planning.
In-theater operations intelligence (OPINTEL) and organic SIGINT assets were
integrated into the joint command structure to assist in providing real-time
indications and warning of Libyan intentions and posture (CNO, 1987, pg. 40).
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American intelligence resources are said to have given President Reagan the impetus
for the attack. Intelligence sources intercepted a message from Khadafi ordering an
attack on Americans "to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties." (Anno,
Einspahr, 1988, pg. 56)
Probably one of the single most important factors contributing to the
mission accomplishment was the clear and unambiguous ROE provided to Kelso
from higher authority. Face to face discussions between Kelso and the SECDEF as
well as approval and delegation of sufficient and timely ROE to individual
commanders and flight crews was meant to ensure that they knew and understood
exactly what actions could and could not be taken. (CNO, 1987, pg. 7)
The array of communications utilized for the raid on Libya evolved
throughout the planning phase. To maintain the surprise factor, secure
communications capability on all tactical circuits was considered essential. During
the initial stages of planning, existing communications facilities were the principal
means of communication. During the combat phase of the raid, airborne
communications systems became the primary means of maintaining command and
control(Anno, Einsphar, 1988, pg. 57). A SATCOM terminal was installed in a KC-
10 to contact the joint commander (located on the carrier U.S.S. America) as well
as other higher headquarters as necessary.
Satellite communication systems supported C2 at all levels including links
to Washington, EUCOM, USAFE, Sixth Fleet, and the USAF F-Ill Wing. Two
SATCOM nets~were used to link commanders to higher headquarters. A SATCOM
terminal was strapped to the KC-104command aircraft to support its airborne C2
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function. In fact, it served as a primary means of communication between Kelso and
the USAF forces commander during the actual combat phase of the operation.
The rationale used for geographically separating the Air Force and the
Navy strike forces was due to communication system incompatibilities. Air Force
F-111s have a quick frequency hopping UHF radio, 'but neither the USAF tankers
or any of the Navy aircraft had this capability. This equipment was installed aboard
the tankers prior to the raid but was not readily available to the Navy aircraft.
(Anno, Einsphar, 1983, pg. 59)
The operation wah designed to be conducted in complete radio silence.
All four refuelings and the comoat strike were performed without communicating.
There was some initial concern among the Air Force pilots because no code word
was established to confirm the go-ahead for the mission. Only an abort code was
provided, and there were so many things that could have gone wrong or change in
the long transit to Tripoli. In fact, a secure call from Headquarters, Strategic Air
Command, in Omaha (tanker representative),to the UK was necessary to confirm
the mission go-ahead. (Anno, Einsphar, pg. 56)
Navy and Air Force communications interfaces between the fighter aircraft
and search and rescue (SAR) aircraft were not worked out in advance by mission
planners. Specific procedures for contacting and coordinating Navy SAR efforts had
not been spelled out in any detail, and furthermore, had not been practiced in the
joint C2 exercise. (Anno, Einsphar, 1988, pg. 60)
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6. Strike Operations
To minimize collateral damage and aircraft loss/aircrew capture, stringent
go/no-go criteria were established. Aircraft without full system capability for
navigation, weapons, radar homing and warning, and radar were required to abort
their mission. Aircraft from U.S.S. America were assigned strike responsibility for
the Benghazi barracks. Additional strike aircraft from U.S.S. America were
deployed to provide support for the strike against Benina. Remaining America
aircraft supported USAF air strikes in the Tripoli area. Air Force F-111 aircraft
were assigned Azizyah barracks, Sidi Bilal complex, and the Tripoli airfield. Some
Navy and Air Force aircraft both suffered from equipment or weapons malfunctions
and had to abort their mission while airborne prior to the strike. (CNO, 1987, pp.
33-34)
The timing of the strike was a critical element to the raid. In fact, one
of the F-111s was delayed in its final refueling prior to rendezvous, and because it
was out of sequence with the rest of the strike force, it aborted (Anno, Einsphar,
1988, pg. 56). The strike plan was designed to be straightforward and simple to
minimize the complexity of coordination among strike elements. Route and altitude
deconfliction was of primary concern to the air space control problem (CNO, 1987,
pg. 36).
Ingress and egress of the strike aircraft was designed to be at 500 feet,
below the Libyan radar horizon. Single-aircraft ingress and egress timing was meant
to retain the element of surprise. The strikes were designed to have simultaneous
attacks on target areas using the element of surprise and cover of darkness to assure
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aircraft survivability (CNO, 1987, pg. 37). An integral part of the strike was support
from electronic surveillance and electronic countermeasures aircraft to suppress
enemy defense. Combat air patrol fighters were also airborne to provide defensive
support of egressing aircraft.
By nearly all post-action accounts, the U.S. strike came as a complete
tactical surprise to Libyan Air Defense Forces. Air defense units, although issued
a general-alert warning in the days just prior to the raid, did not show any increased
state of readiness. Furthermore, Libyan C3 was characterized as chaotic with U.S.
jamming adding to confusion among higher echelon C2 efforts. Although numerous
Libyan interceptor aircraft were available to launch against the U.S. strike force,
none were. The reason for this remains unclear. (CNO, 1987, pg. 39)
Strike aircraft target acquisition was difficult because some of the targets
were located within dense urban areas. Navigation systems aboard these aircraft-
could not fully cope with overland track timing and a lack of known reference points
(CNO, 1987, pg. 45). Imagery inaccuracies also contributed to difficulties in target
pinpointing efforts. Lack of low level flying proficiency among U.S. pilots was one
of the principal causes for these -difficulties (CNO, 1987, pg. 49).
There were other C2 difficulties that caused troubles during the egress.
Tragically, an aircraft and its two crew members were lost during the combat.
Limited communications caused problems linking up the strike aircraft with waiting
tankers after exiting the combat zone. With one strike plane missing, it took the air
armada over an hour trying to account for the missing aircraft. (Anno, Einsphar,
1988, pg. 60)
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Finally, high frequency (HF) equipment located at Mildenhall, UK, was
used to confirm the number of aircraft which had returned from the strike area
(Anno, Einsphar, 1988, pg. 60). Coincidentally, the Navy SAR effort was severely
hampered when trying to locate the missing F-111. In the final analysis, the full
tanker force had been vulnerable to Libyan air defense aircraft which fortunately
never launched.
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B. QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDENTS
1. Explain the role of cross-familiarization between service standard operating
procedures in the unification of services and interoperability.
2. How does having a clear and well understood set of rules of engagement
enhance the delegation of authority to the lowest operational level?
3. What role does expanded intelligence distribution play in the planning phase
of a military operation? How does the cross-flow of intelligence information
between services aid in reducing inherent interoperability shortfalls among the
services?
4. Explain how a quick reaction operation is affected by "jury-rigging" or re-
configuring of communications resources. What is the impact of not having
pre-established communications capability in joint contingency operations?
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IX. CASE STUDY NUMBER FOUR
A. THE RESCUE OF THE S.S. MAYAGUEZ
1. Introduction
On 12 May 1975, the S.S. Mayaguez, an American Merchant Marine ship,
was seized by Cambodian soldiers in an act of piracy. The S.S. Mayaguez was seized
in international waters 60 miles off the coast of Cambodia as she was making way
from Hong Kong to the port of Sattahip, Thailand. The attackers, using armed
patrol boats, fired a rocket and machine guns across the bow of the merchant ship
forcing it to stop. Once aboard, the Cambodian attackers ordered the vessel's
captain to follow their patrol boats to the mainland port of Sihanoukville.
Fortunately, the captain had time to radio his position and a mayday message to the
vessel's owner (the Sealand Service Corporation) in Jakarta, Indonesia. The U.S.
embassy there rclayed the mayday to the National Military Command Center
(NMCC) in Washington, D.C..(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 62)
Within only six hours of the S.S. Mayaguez capture, President Ford called
together his closest advisors for a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC).
He directed U.S. aircraft based at U Tapao, Thailand, to begin immediate search
and reconnaissance missions to locate the ship. Following the NSC meeting, the
White House issued a press release terming the seizure an act of piracy, holding the
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government of Cambodia responsible, and suggesting military retaliation if the vessel
and her crew were not released. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 3)
Thus were set in motion forces which resulted in a short yet significant
military operation. In only 78 hours following the S.S. Mayaguez mayday, U.S. Air
Force aircraft bombed, strafed, and sank Khmer patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam.
The Marines invaded Cambodian territory, establishing a beachhead on the small
island of Koh Tang located in the gulf. After a vicious fight with Khmer Rouge
forces that only lasted approximately two days, the Marines withdrew. Other
Marines recaptured the ship, boarding from a Navy frigate in the first such action
since the 19th Century. Carrier-based Navy aircraft bombed targets on the
Cambodian mainland in a harsh and dramatic display of punitive retaliation. Air
Force helicopters transported the-Marines to and from Koh Tang with support from-
additional Air Force firepower.
In mid-action, for unknown reasons, the Khmer Rouge released the crew
of the S.S. Mayaguez, sending them out from the port of Kimpong Som in a fishing
boat to a waiting Navy destroyer. Meanwhile, the Marines would continue to fight
the Khmer Rouge entrenched on Koh Tang for another eight hours (Guilmartin,
1990, pg. 3). This incident has been symbolized as the last U.S. military act of the
Vietnam war.
2. Background
At the time of the Mayaguez incident, little was known or postulated with
regard tc the new rulers of Cambodia,-- the Khmer Rouge, Having only-captured
Phnom Penh less than one month earlier, the Khmer Rouge leadership was still
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consolidating its power in Cambodia. Consequently, President Ford and his advisors
had no real idea as to why the Cambodian rulers would take such a great risk just
to embarrass the U.S.. It was postulated at the time that the S.S. Mayaguez may
have been seized based on the initiative of some local commander. (Guilmartin,
1990, pg. 9)
The ghost of the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis haunted many military planners in
Washington. In that incident, locally available U.S. air and naval forces were not
deployed promptly against the North Korean attackers. As a consequence, the
North Koreans were able to secure the vessel inport, remove the crew, and render
military intervention ineffective. The brutal Korean exploitation of the U.S.S.
Pueblo's captain and crew exacted a deep and lasting diplomatic price. The Ford
administration drew the parallel explicitly. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 10)
The seizure of an unarmed merchant vessel was a different matter from
that of a naval vessel, but the opportunity for effective military intervention was
expected to diminish rapidly nonetheless. These considerations were sufficient to
compel a swift operational military response. In the years since the Pueblo incident,
advancements in communications technology-made it possible for President Ford and
his advisors to be kept informed on a near real-time basis as the situation developed
in the Gulf of Siam. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 10)
Politically, the need for urgency was confined by the provisions of the War
Powers Act of 1973. 'Ibis act required presidential consultation with Congress
before the initiation of armed conflict by U.S. forces and a written justification of
the commitment within 48 hours. President Ford and his advisors were clearly
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anxious to resolve matters before congressional politics interfered. The need for a
quick resolution was to exert an overriding operational influence. (Guilmartin, 1990,
pg. 10)
3. The Mission
President Ford and his key advisors decided on three overlapping military
objectives: to rescue the ship and crew; to avoid the possibility of a hostage crisis;
and to use U.S. forces for a demonstration aimed at bolstering American credibility
abroad (which was particularly low in the aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam and
the humiliation suffered from the evacuation of Saigon two weeks earlier). The
central objective was to recover the ship and crew, and subsequent actions suggest
that the president was prepared, if need be, to give priority to the avoidance of a
hostage situation at the expense of the crew's welfare. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 12)
Thc seizure of S.S. Mayaguez came only two weeks after the evacuation
of Saigon, and most all of the task-force elements used in that operation -- which
had been conducted near the coast of Cambodia -- had returned to their normal
duties. When the White House issued the order for the military to formulate its
contingency plans for the rescue action, the Pentagon quickly realized that there
were few resources in the area with which to execute any operation. Only two Navy
ships were close enough to be of any use, and they were 24 hours from Koh Tang.
The carrier, U.S.S. Coral Sea, was re-directed from her transit to Australia to make
all speed for Cambodia while two combatants, U.S.S. Henry B. Wilson and U.S.S.
Holt, were ordered to break off their e:ercises off the coast of the Philippines and
proceed to Koh Tang. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 13)
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Two squadrons-of the 7th Air Force were deployed at U Tapao, 195 miles
from Koh Tang. The closest ground forces were the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force
(MAF) deployed in Okinawa, ten flight hours from Koh Tang. U Tapao would be
the staging area for the operation, and the Air Force had Navy A-7s, HH-53
helicopters, AC-130 gunships, and reconnaissance aircraft available to support the
mission. The 1100 combat Marines on Okinawa would have to be airlifted from
there to U Tapao. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 66)
The plan involved two different phases. The first was to airlift and insert
a sufficiently large combat force of Marines aboard the S.S. Mayaguez to recapture
it from the Cambodians (presumed -to still be aboard). The second part of the plan
was to transport via helicopter a Marine combat assault force to Koh Tang to seize
and hold the island. Despite the simplicity of this plan, insufficient helicopters were
available to do both of these operations simultaneously. There were not even
enough helicopters to lift a sufficiently large combat force to subdue the island.
Nevertheless, military commanders at U Tapao decided to execute the mission.
(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 68)
The first proposal called for a Marine helicopter assault against the S.S.
Mayaguez. Landing the helicopters aboard the container ship was not considered
feasible, so the planners o-dered ladders and rappeling gear for the Marines to use
from hovering helicopters over the containers aboard the S.S. Mayaguez. Once on
deck, the Marines would use ladders and special platforms to move from container
to container until they had overcome the enemy. Fortunately, this plan, suicidal at
best, was rejected -by a review board.
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A second plan, devised only hours before the assault was to begin, was
significantly different. It called for helicopters to transfer a force of 48 Marines, six
Navy explosives experts, and six civilian seamen from MSC to the U.S.S. Holt. The
frigate, standing off from the merchant vessel by two miles, would then close the S.S.
Mayaguez, pull alongside, and the Marines would storm aboard. Seconds prior to
this assault, A-7s would drop riot-control gas aboard the merchant to disable and
confuse the enemy. The Marines would assault wearing gas masks and clear the
ship with hostile fire and hand-to-hand combat. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 69)
Eleven available helicopters were to launch from U Tapao at the same
time. Three of these HH-53 Jolly Green Giants would transport the Marines to the
Navy frigate. The other eight would fly past the S.S. Mayaguez and land 180
Marines at Koh Tang. The island, only three miles long, has two slivers of beach
which were to be used as landing zones (LZ.) The plan was to put two Marine
contingents ashore, one at each beach opposite sides of a narrow land spit jutting
out into the water. The first contingent, one reinforced platoon, would land on the
western LZ while the other contingent of two platoons would land on the larger
eastern LZ. A mortar section would provide fire support in the eastern LZ to the
west. The helicopters would then return to U Tapao to refuel and take
reinforcements back to Koh Tang. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 70)
The round trip from Koh Tang to U Tapao would take at least four and
a half hours, and the ability to move a sizeable reinforcement hinged on all eleven
helicopters being available. The planners of this part of the operation made the
assumption there would be clear weather and that no helicopters would be lost tu
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equipment malfunction, accidents or hostile fire. They consequently put the lives of
180 Marines in the balance. The Marine assault was to be supported by naval
gunfire from the two Navy combatants and Air Force air strikes called in by the
ground commander. Aircraft from the carrier would also provide air support later
in the day. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 70)
4. Command Relationships
As the senior commander in the area, the 7th Air Force (7AF)
commander was assigned responsibility for the operation. This command had been
combined with the U.S. Support Activity Group (USSAG) which was the last
remnant of Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV.) Headquarters for
USSAG/7AF was based at Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. The USSAG/7AF
commander was Lt. General John J. Burns, USAF, and in accordance with normal
practice, his deputy was Army Major General I. A. Hunt, Jr. (Gilmartin, 1990, pg.
16). Operational command relationships extended upward through Commander in
Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Noel Gayler, based at Pearl Harbor, to
SECDEF James Schlesinger who would exercise control through the National
Military Command Center (NMCC), to the President (Gilmartin, 1990, pg. 16).
Command of the ground operations fell to Marine Colonel John M.
Johnson, who led a command group formed from the 3rd MAF (Gabriel, 1985, pg.
66). When the order came to deploy the Marines, they had been out in central
Okinawa for two days on a training exercise. Within three hours of receiving the
order, four of the battalion's infantry companies Teturxmed to their main base and
prepared to stage at the Kadena airfield. By morning, all Marine forces had been
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assembled at Kadena, loaded aboard a C-141, and deployed to Thailand. One hour
later, Battalion Landing Team 2/9 followed. Within ten hours, the Marine assault
force was in place at U Tapao ready for combat. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 66)
As COMUSSAG, Burns reported operationally to CINCPAC, but as
Commander 7AF (C7AF), he reported administratively to Headquarters, Pacific Air
Forces (PACAF) in the Philippines. Air Forces in Thailand were administratively
under the 13th Air Force in the Philippines with the exception of SAC Forces at
U Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base (RTNB) which was under CINCSAC, Omaha,
Nebraska. These assets would come under Burns as C7AF when committed to
combat. The role of the JCS was by law only advisory, but their need for
information and access to it quickly brought them into the decision-making process
(Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 16). Admiral Gayler was in Washington at the time of the
incident and ended up working with the JCS throughout the crisis. Through their
control of the NMCC, the JCS were to act as an intermediate level of command.
General Burns was given complete OPCON over USAF forces, naval forces and
Marines. In all cases, he was going to act through an airborne command post
orbiting off the coast of Thailand. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 16)
General Burns was directly responsible for combat operations in the Gulf
of Siam. He formed a tactical planning and execution cadre whose nucleus was
comprised of senior commanders and staff officers from 13AF, USSAG, and 7AF.
It included fighter pilots, helicopter pilots and navigation experts. In addition, two
of the pilots had carrier experience. The arrival of Colonel Johnson, USMC,
rounded out this team. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 29)
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S. Command, Control and Communications
Intelligence estimates of Khmer Rouge strength on Koh Tang available
to mission planners was varied in detail. Commander, Intelligence Pacific (IPAC),
estimated a strength of 90 - 100 troops plus a heavy weapons squad armed with
mortars and heavy machine guns. The DIA estimated a force of 150 - 200 with
about the same amount of heavy weapons. After the assault, the Marine assault
force commander estimated that his force had been opposed by about 150 soldiers
well equipped with heavy weapons. Unfortunately, neither the IPAC nor DIA
estimates were briefed to the assault force. This information, as it turned out, may
have been an important consideration prior to placing the marines on Koh Tang.
(Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 27)
Two days following the taking of the S.S. Mayaguez, U.S. planners were
fairly certain- that the crew was no longer aboard the vessel. It became evident that
most, if not all, of the crew had been removed from the ship and might still be on
Koh Tang or taken to the mainland. Navy and Air Force pilots had located the ship
anchored a mile off the northeast tip of Koh Tang and had observed the offloading
and transfer of 30 - 40 personnel -- presumably the crew -- to the island. Aircraft
involved in these overflights of Koh Tang had been fired-at by patrol boats and anti-
aircraft positions on the island. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 23)
By this time, USSAG/7AF headquarters at Nakhon Phanom, CINCPAC
headquarters in Hawaii and PACAF headquarters in the Philippines were linked to
one another. They were also linked to forces under their command and to the
NMCC and White House through a sophisticated real time voice communications
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net. On a selective basis, this net could also link up with tactical aircraft on the
scene. (Guilmartin, 1990, pg. 24)
By agreement, U.S. Navy patrol aircraft assumed responsibility for tracking
ship traffic while USAF aircraft assumed responsibility for cordoning off the S.S.
Mayaguez and Koh Tang. To prevent transfer of the crew to the mainland, U.S.
aircraft were authorized to fire warning shots ahead of the boats departing the
island. When Air Force fighter-bombers observed a fishing boat, escorted by
gunboats, make a run from Koh Tang toward the mainland, bombs were dropped
ahead of the boat. Its escorting patrol boats were sunk, and it was doused with riot-
control gas. Officials back in Washington were kept abreast of the developments.
At one point, a fighter pilot recommended shooting off the boat's rudder with
cannon fire, but on a low pass, reported seeing Caucasians on deck. President Ford
was in direct contact with aircrews on the scene, and when he heard this news, he
ordered the fighters to allow the fishing boat to proceed. It was observed entering
Kompong Som harbor and mooring later that morning. It was in this environment
that USSAG/7AF, in constant consultation with higher authorities in Washington,
CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii, and PACAF headquarters in the Philippines,
settled on the final plan to simultaneously assault the S.S. Mayaguez and Koh Tang.
(Guilmartin, 1990, pp. 24-25)
6. The Rescue and the Assault
At 0230 on 15 May, combat Marines of the assault force assembled near
the-helicopters at U Tapao, A C-130 aircraftoorbiting-90 miles- away-was-responsible -
for overall command of the operation. The commander of the ground assault-force,
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Colonel Johnson, and his staff elected to remain in Thailand until after the first
wave hit Koh Tang and then go in with the reinforcements. Direct operational
command of the assault passed then to the airborne mission commander orbiting in
his aircraft. These command and control relationships were not the normal
operational relationships for Marine operations. Instead of a clear line of command
running from the' field units to a combat staff deployed on the island and then to a
nearby command post aboard ship, these critical command links ran from the
commander on the ground to the mission commander in the air ninety miles away.
Should anything have disrupted these communications, the Marines would have been
isolated on the island. Two hours later, helicopters carrying the assault forces to
U.S.S. Holt and to Koh Tang took off from U Tapao enroute to their respective
missions. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 71)
The assault on the S.S. Mayaguez went-as planned. The three helicopters
rendezvoused with U.S.S. Holt on schedule and transferred the troops aboard. Once
the assault force was aboard, the U.S.S. Holt pulled alongside the Mayaguez and
prepared to board and seize. At the same time, A-7s appeared and dropped-the
incapacitating gas. As the Marines rushed the ship, they realized that the
Cambodians had abandoned it. Navy explosives experts searched the ship for
demolition charges but found none. With the vessel secured, the team of civilian
seamen from MSC made preparations to weigh anchor and get S.S. Mayaguez
underway. In one hour, the assault forces had achieved their goal and ran an
American flag up the ship's mast. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 71)
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Just prior to the assault, the Cambodians on the mainland freed the crew
and sent them toward their ship aboard a fishing boat flying a white flag. This
situation had gone unnoticed by many combat and reconnaissance aircraft in the
area. The fishing boat cautiously approached U.S.S. Wilson and, when the Navy ship
recognized the passengers aboard, flashed Washington with the news of the safe
return of the crew. (Guilmartin, 1985, pg. 72)
The crew's release had been secured by diplomatic means rather than by
military action. At this point, however, the military operation was gaining
momentum, and despite the safe return of the crew members by the Cambodians,
the assault on Koh Tang continued. No action was taken to call off the planned air
raids against the mainland airport and oil storage facilities even though they served
no useful military purpose. Furthermore, the helicopters on their way to land
Marines on Koh Tang were not called back. In fact, as the plan proceeded and as
it was apparent that things were going badly for the Marines, a decision was made
by USSAG/7AF to reinforce the Marines who had landed in the wrong place.
(Guilmartin, 1985, pg. 72)
The Marines were specifically put ashore at Koh Tang because it was
believed that the S.S. Mayaguez crew was still being held there despite evidence to
the contrary. Reconnaissance aircraft had earlier witnessed the off-loading of the
crew in Sihanoukville. The crew was actually being held-on the small island of Koh
Rong within the harbor. Information that, except for the S.S. Mayaguez's presence
off-shore, no American personnel were held at Koh Tang was known by relevant
commanders and the president. The assault on Koh Tang was allowed to proceed
108
anyway with the intention of teaching the Cambodians a lesson. (Gabriel, 1985, pg.
73)
Tactical maps of Koh Tang island did not exist. A dense jungle with a
thick canopy foliage impaired intelligence collection attempts against the island's
defenses. Relying on fishermen, sea captains, and Cambodians and Thais living in
U Tapao to provide descriptions of the island, intelligence planners determined that
there were no military fortifications on the island. They expected to find no more
than about 20 elderly people -- despite the knowledge that enemy forces had to be
present if the crew of S.S. Mayaguez was in fact being held there. (Gabriel, 1985,
pg. 74)
The Marine assault force was totally unprepared for the size and
disposition of the enemy force that met them. The Marines had little or no
knowledge of the island's terrain, and their landing zone faced a thick jungle from
which the tiemy's defensive positions had been established. Furthermore, with their
backs to the sea, the Marines were unable to extract themselves once committed.
(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 75)
The balance of forces favored the Cambodians by a ratio of almost three
to two. The Marines faced a numerically superior enemy who could fire at them
from two directions. Because there were no hostile forces expected on the island
based on locally obtained intelligence information (recall that the DIA and IPAC
reports had not been made available to the assault force), no suppressive air or
naval gunfire was used. The thick jungle canopy prevented observation of enemy
positions anyway. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 76)
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In the first fifteen minutes of the Marine landing, the mission had become
a disaster. Helicopters and troops came under intense fire from concealed enemy
positions. The Marines lost almost 40 percent of their combat force in their initial
assault against Koh Tang. Almost all of the helicopters in the first assault wave
suffered severe damage or were shot down. The loss of these helicopters (seven
total) meant that the marines no longer had sufficient airlift for reinforcement from
U Tapao. Even so, reinforcements would not be able to help trapped comrades for
nearly five hours. The Marines who were under heavy attack by the Cambodians
could do nothing but construct a perimeter defense and wait. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 77)
In addition, the KC-10 failed to relay messages from the Marines at Koh
Tang to headquarters at U Tapao because the communications circuits on the
airborne KC-10 were saturated. The KC-10 had apparently become preoccupied
with helicopter rescue operations of the Marines on the ground who were coming
under heavy, intense fire. The KC-10 controllers inadvertently directed attention
away from reinforcement and support of the Marines. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 67)
Of the 127 men in the second assault team, only 100 were actually placed
on the island. With these men, the combined force numbered 225, separated in
three elements and pinned down by the enemy. Although the original mission was
to secure the island and hold it for 48 hours, it soon became clear that the Marines
had no chance of securing the island and rescuing anyone (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 78).
To the ground commanders, it was clear that they had to break out and link up if
they were to consolidate their defenses and survive. Failing to do so would make
it impossible to extract the force when the time came. Near the end of the second
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day, western area forces were able to link up but remained cut-off from eastern area
troops by an alley of hostile enemy fire. (Gabriel, 1985, pg. 79)
The Marines had lost their tactical air-control radios in the surf when their
helicopter was shot down. As a consequence, they could not call in air strikes.
Some innovative methods were used by the Marines to direct the efforts of strike
aircraft, but the distance between the Marines and suspected enemy strong positions
was tog close, thus making the risk of getting hit by friendly fire too great. Air
support was used effectively, but naval gunfire was used only during the evacuation
because by then the distance between enemy and Marine positions had increased.
Midmorning on 15 May, the President gave the order to cease all military
activity and withdraw the Marine forces from Koh Tang. The evacuation efforts
lasted for nearly 24 hours. Much of the attempt was conducted in total darkness.
Helicopters became easy targets for the enemy, but Marine OV-10 tactical air-
control aircraft were used to spot muzzle flashes in the dark and direct AC-130
gunships to suppress enemy fire. Finally, at approximately 0810, helicopters went in
for the last time to pick up-two remaining Marines who had stayed to ensure no one
was left behind, and the battle for Koh Tang was over.
The decision to invade Koh Tang cost the lives of 18 men with 50 more
wounded. Twelve heavy-lift helicopters had been destroyed or damaged. Normally,
when a force suffers 30 percent casualties, it is considered no-longer combat
effective. At Koh Tang, 265 percent of the 250 man force was rendered ineffective.
It is considered among analysts in post-action,reports that the Marines-landed-in- a
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non combat-effective status failing to accomplish the mission it had been given.
(Gabriel, 1985, pg. 82)
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B. QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDENTS
1. Explain how communications helped or hindered the operational chain of
command. What impact does having the capability for the president to
communicate directly with troops in the field have on command structure?
2. Explain how intelligence distribution affects the planning phase of an
operation. Does a cross flow of intelligence information between services and
agencies help reduce interoperability problems? If so, how?
3. Describe how centralization and sldpping echelons (by-passing the normal
chain of command) can affect operational levels in the chain.
4. How does information overload on command centers (associated with
advanced C3 technology) impact a rapid paced combat environment?
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X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis provides material on a number of relevant C3 issues facing today's
military establishment. An introduction to such topics as interoperability, unity of
command, echelon skipping in command structures, the joint arena, the role of
communications and the impact of standardization are considered. This study puts
these issues in the context of a series of case studies which examine the effects of
practices and patterns of C3 on past military contingency operations. Together, the
four quick reaction contingency operations examined took place over a span of
almost twelve years, with some actions separated from another by approximately two
years -- yet, the C3 lessons learned from each effort remain remarkably the same.
This situation certainly raises doubt as to whether these lessons derived from the
earliest actions were effectively learned and incorporated into the planning and
execution of subsequent operations. In the author's opinion, the consistency over
time of the lessons learned from these operations seems to indicate a problem in the
military's ability to transfer experience and effectively institutionalize corrective
actions. Although a detailed analysis of the reasons why the military has been
unsuccessfal at transferring lessons to future operations is beyond the scope of this
thesis, some general observations are considered relevant. The nature of the lessons
learned from each of the cases presented seems to fall into two broad, yet basic
categories: (1) planning, and (2) equipment inadequacies.
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A great deal of progress has been made with respect to improving planning
efforts. The CAS and JOPS are both specifically designed to structure and formalize
the planning process. It is important to military planners that all aspects of a
military operation are considered and assessed. Too often, detailed planning for
contingency operations is performed on an ad hoc basis at base and unit levels.
Here, planning is done by qualified, operationally experienced personnel, but not by
planning-experienced personnel. Today's joint professional military education
programs are making inroads at providing a structured process for developing a
cadre of professional military planners. In the past, individuals who are richly
experienced in operational matters were forced to learn to plan contingency
operations as they were doing it on the job. The result was a wide range of planning
quality. Additionally, the ad hoc nature and the generally compressed time frames
of contingency planning seem to further degrade the quality of planning.
The equipment problem can be categorized as a lack of interoperability and
a lack of adequacy or availability. Lack of secure voice communications and
inadequate satellite channel capacity have been long standing problems. Irrespective
of the development and procurement process, in the author's opinion, there seems
to be a lack of commitment or willingness to redirect or assign resources necessary
to fix equipment deficiencies in the C3 arena. The traditional approach seems to
be to develop quick fixes to work around the problem. This method is-bloth clumsy
and inefficient, and provides only short term solutions. Joint contingency responses
and operations require standard configurations and compatible, interoperable
equipment as a permanent feature of the four services.
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One of the principal conclusions reached in this thesis is that there are
inherent institutional and organizational constraints on the use of advanced C3
technology for the conduct of contingency or crisis action operations. The
technological capabilities for remote control and instant communications with
operational combat units, do not, in-and by themselves, result in any added flexibility
or any greater organizational coherence, than an effective C3 system is supposed to
provide. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that when advanced C3 technology
is applied without organizational adjustments and changes in operational procedures,
it contributes to failures of control and communications. In the author's opinion,
this area of C3 is not thoroughly or systematically treated in the literature on C3 and
hence in the course work at the Naval Postgraduate School. It is an area which
requires additional systematic research.
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